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Abstract 
The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (hereinafter the Quad) is an alignment between Australia, 
India, Japan and the United States of America against a perceived threat to a rules-based order 
and of a rising China. With the majority of its early development occurring in 2007, the Quad 
ceased in 2008 due to Australia’s withdrawal, but was renewed in 2017. Given that a realist 
understanding of alignment formation posits that balancing occurs as a response to system-level 
factors, such as an imbalance of power or threat, and an expectation that a continued or even 
growing imbalance of threat implies continued balancing efforts, this fluctuation in Australia’s 
alignment decisions in a short time period presents the puzzle of this study. 
The aim of this thesis is, therefore, to explain the deviation in Australia’s alignment decisions in 
the Quad (from alignment (2007), to withdrawal (2008), and back (2017) to alignment) in the 
face of a perception of continuous presence of threat from China (i.e. of a continued imbalance 
of threat). To do so, this study turns to balance of threat for an analysis of the system-level 
pressures contributing to Australia’s alignment decisions; and a variant of realist thought through 
the works of neoclassical realists and other scholars to perform an analysis of the impact and 
influence of specific domestic-level factors (deemed domestic-level costs for the purpose of this 
thesis) on the perceived cost-benefit of external alignment by Australian decision makers. This 
study thereby applies these theoretical frameworks to an analysis of Australia’s alignment 
decisions in the context of the Quad during the period in question, through a combination of 
document analysis and qualitative content analysis.  
This thesis finds that while the perception of China’s threat remained consistent and high, it was 
changes at the domestic-level that triggered the back-and-forth of Australian political leaders’ 
alignment decisions. With these findings, this study contributes to highlighting the importance in 
taking domestic-level factors into consideration in the examination of balancing behaviour and 
alignment decisions, as well as a deeper understanding of alignment formation, and the Quad 
itself.   
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The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (hereinafter the Quad), which comprises of Australia, 
India, Japan and the United States of America, is an alignment focused on and purposed 
towards promoting freedom and the rule of law, and supporting and ensuring a “free and 
open”, “prosperous”, and “rules-based order in the” Indo-Pacific region (Buchan & 
Rimland, 2020, p. 2-4; Envall, 2019, p. 2-6). Although the earliest origins of the Quad are 
rooted in a cooperative effort between the four member states to provide tsunami relief in 
2004, it grew into a more significant, yet informal, grouping in 2007 through the initiative 
of Prime Minister Shino Abe of Japan (Envall, 2019; Sharma, 2010). It is generally 
understood that the Quad is purposed towards an increased strategic partnership between 
the members, as well as facilitating cooperation on issues requiring security cooperation 
and maintaining ‘balance’ in the region1 (Sharma 2010; p. 238-239). In this way, the Quad 
has largely been perceived as being purposed towards acting as a balancing or containment 
mechanism against China by a variety of observers, such as those at different levels of state 
and political leadership as well as analysts (Buchan & Rimland, 2020, Envall, 2019; Pan, 
2018). 
The first iteration of the Quad led to tensions between China, the Quad itself, and its 
individual members. China issued formal diplomatic protests to each member state 
(Nicholson, 2007) “based on its fear that the four countries were ganging up against China 
in a security alliance” (Sharma, 2010; p. 239)2. While Australia, and other Quad members, 
repeatedly reassured Beijing that China was not under threat (Nicholson, 2007; Sharma, 
 
1 For more of an overview of the Quad, see (for example): Envall, David. "The Quadrilateral Security 
Dialogue: Towards an Indo-Pacific Order?." (2019); Graham, E., Pan, C., Hall, I., Kersten, R., Zala, B., & Percy, 
S. (2018). Debating the quad. Strategic & Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University; or, Sharma, 
A. (2010). The quadrilateral initiative: an evaluation. South Asian Survey, 17(2), 237-253. 
2 The question of whether the Quad should considered a strategy of ‘balance’ against China, and if it is 
essentially a containment strategy for the increasingly rising China power is one of much debate (Buchan & 
Rimland 2020; Sharma, 2010). 
11 
 
2010), China’s distrust continued until Australia’s withdrawal from the group in the first 
half of 2008, upon which the Quad ceased. Nearly a decade later, however, the Quad has 
been revitalized with all members committing to its reformation with the issue of joint 
statements during the 2017 ASEAN Summits (Rej, 2018). Since then, Australia, and the 
other Quad members have participated in a number of semi-regular summits, military drills, 
cooperative initiatives, and information exchanges that have only increased in frequency 
and formality (Buchan & Rimland, 2020). During which, the sentiment by outside 
observers that the Quad exists as a response to a Chinese threat has only grown. This means 
that, within a decade, Australia has at multiple points in time, decisively changed its 
decision to externally align in the face of a continuous a perception of Chinese threat, from 
alignment (2007), to withdrawal (2008), and again to alignment (2017). This pattern 
represents the puzzle the present study aims to address.  
The existing literature on the Quad and the decisions of its members to align is rather 
limited, although there have been a number of academics and policy analysts who have 
looked at it as a phenomenon of interest. Academic studies that have been published on the 
Quad tend towards an examination of the relevance and future potential of the Quad’s 
strategic value as a group (Sharma, 2010; Singh & Teo, 2020); and concerning the strategic 
interests of the individual members in the context the Quad (Jie 2019; Lee, 2016; Wilkins, 
2011). More, however, has been written on the Quad by policy analysts and within the 
context of policy reports and briefing papers (see, for example: Envall, 2019; Hanada, 
2018; Wilkins, 2018). These documents, in turn, offer a different focus, and offer an 
examination into China’s response to the Quad (Buchan & Rimland, 2020, Jie, 2019; 
Spagnol, 2020) and provide a deeper understanding of the Quad, in terms of its purpose, 
and the motivations that underline its existence as a whole and from the perspectives of 
individual members (Tow, 2019; Eisentraut & Gaens, 2012; Buchan & Rimland 2020).  
Two common threads appear throughout this literature on the Quad, however, the first is a 
focus on the Quad during and after 2017, where it is headed and its potential (Buchan & 
Rimland, 2020; Envall, 2019; Hanada, 2018). While the second is a pattern of critiques 
concerning the lack of exacting details observers are able to pin down about the Quad, 
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which results in studies that look to define the goals and exact nature of the arrangement 
itself (Buchan & Rimland, 2020; Lee, 2016; Sharma, 2010; Singh & Teo, 2020; Wilkins, 
2011). This has left a gap in the literature wherein the beginning and 2008 cessation of the 
Quad, and crucially Australia’s role in it, as well as the factors influencing Australia’s 
alignment decision-making are left unexamined beyond its implications for the future, and 
cursory overviews for the purposes of introduction. The purpose of this thesis is to address 
a part of this gap, and to provide a deeper understanding of Australia’s variation in 
alignment decisions – first joining, then departing, and then re-joining the Quad. Thus, the 
research question this thesis aims to answer is: What explains Australia’s alignment 
decisions vis-à-vis the first formation, cessation and reformation of the Quad over a short 
period of time, despite the fact that the perceive threat posed by China has been 
continuously present?  
In order to answer this question, this study draws on realist accounts of balancing. It draws 
on balance of threat theory, and the influence of domestic level factors. To do so, the study 
brings in an element of neoclassical realism, along with the works of other scholars such as 
Barnett and Levy (1991) to examine two specific domestic-level factors; the perception of 
the domestic economy and electoral concerns, which together are terms domestic-level 
costs. In the context of this theoretical framework, this study hypothesizes that the reason 
for Australia’s decisions is that if domestic-level cost are high, a perception of threat does 
not lead to external alignment decisions, whereas if domestic-level costs are low, a 
perception of threat leads to external alignment. This means that domestic-level costs act as 
an intervening variable3 by modifying the impact of system-level factors (i.e. threat). 
Thereby, this study attempts to explain Australia’s alignment decisions by taking into 
account the domestic-level factors occurring within the periods in question – 2007, 2008, 
and 2017, juxtaposed against the system-level factor of Australia’s perception of China’s 
threat. Doing so enable this study to account not only for Australia’s puzzling alignment 
decisions, leading to the unsteady trajectory of the Quad, but also to assess the relative 
 
3 Intervening variables are composed of concepts or phenomena that are believed to mediate and/or modify 
the independent variable’s effect over the object of study (Dawood, 2016). 
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explanatory power of system-level and domestic-level factors in explaining the balancing 
behaviour of states.  
This thesis consists of three chapters; the first presents the theoretical frameworks utilized 
to explain the events under consideration and outlines the system and domestic-level 
variables and indicators being taken into account. The second chapter lays out the method 
applied to the empirical study itself, and provides deeper detail of the case and data 
selection, and the third chapter presents both the data and its interpretation, examined by 
year, to paint a full picture of Australia’s alignment decisions at three moments of time and 
the conditions that explain these choices, with reference to domestic-level factors (i.e. the 
perceived condition of the domestic economy and electoral concerns) and at the system-
level, i.e. Australia’s perception of China’s threat. This is then followed by the final 
conclusions of the thesis. 
2. Theoretical Framework: Balance of threat and the influence of domestic-level 
factors on balancing 
 
This chapter of the thesis explains the concepts of alliances and alignment, and presents 
balance of power and balance of threat theories as explanations for alliances and alignment 
that have a focus on system-level pressures. Followed by an introduction of neoclassical 
realism to highlight domestic-level factors in explaining alignment decisions. The first 
section of this chapter will provide both an overview and more detailed specifications of the 
alliance and alignment concepts to offer clarification on how the Quad itself can be 
understood in relation to the literature. The second section turns from conceptualizations to 
theoretical explanations and introduces and examines different ‘balancing’ theories, 
grounded in neo-realist thinking and focused on the system-level of analysis, for an 
understanding of under which system-level conditions alliances and alignments occur. The 
third section introduces neoclassical realism, as a variant of realist thought, and focuses on 
the domestic-level of analysis in order to introduce and provide an explanation of how 
domestic-level conditions are both important, and mediate system-level pressures (to align); 
as well as some academics outside the neoclassical realist approach but whom have 
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predominately emphasized the role of domestic conditions for alignment behaviour and 
heavily feature in the work of neoclassical realists. This third section also provides further 
understanding and structure to the selection of the domestic-level variables of this thesis, 
and is immediately followed by an explanation of those variables. Together, these 
theoretical approaches will provide the backdrop for this thesis, and the examination of 
Australia’s alignment decisions in the context of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue and 




When exploring the dynamics underpinning Australia’s alignment decisions in the context 
of the Quad, it is necessary to first conceptualize the phenomenon of interest – the Quad 
itself – and ask whether and how it fits into the existing understanding of alliances and 
alignments. Often, IR literature ascribes that a security cooperation between states, 
especially where there is a military dimension and occurs in the face of a threat, is a form of 
alliance (Gärtner, 2001; Modelski 1963; Walt, 1990; Weitsman, 1998; McGowan & Rood, 
1975), yet an alliance conceptualization may not be the most fitting for the Quad, thus, this 
thesis turns first to an examination of alliances and then to alignments. Looking first to 
alliances, it is clear that an “alliance”, as a concept, is both a central and consistently 
present locus within the topic of international relations  (Wilkins, 2012). The topic of 
alliances, what they are and how they come to be, is a wide ranging branch of literature that 
stems from the earliest centuries. The concept of state relationships within the context of 
international relations has been recorded as far back as 3rd BCE (Wilkins, 2012, p. 55) and 
has continued to be a subject of great importance throughout time, with figures such as 
Thucydides, Machiavelli and Sun Tzu weighing in on alliances, on what powers and sway 
allies should or should not be granted, and what constitutes a preferable or prosperous 
arrangement (Walt, 1985).  
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As an empirical phenomenon, alliances and alignments come in many forms.  While 
alliances have been of central importance to IR throughout all of history, there has never 
been a single ‘one’ accepted definition of the concept itself (Bergsmann, 2001, p. 25). 
Compounding this issue is the fact that many conceptualisations of alliance are so loose4 
that practically “any security-related communication among or between states” (Wilkins, 
2012, p. 55) could be considered to constitute as an alliance, and have, thereby, been 
suggested by some academics as being more suited for rejection (Wilkins, 2012). This 
means that it is important and necessary to clarify the characteristics of the concept as it is 
understood for the purposes of this thesis. To do so, this thesis first turns to an 
understanding of why alliances are formed, before looking to the characteristics of such 
groupings. 
A number of causes of alliance formation have been theorized. It is postulated that states 
form alliances to protect themselves from the domination of other states (Walt, 1985, p. 
viii-5). While it has also been suggested that the “most defining feature of any alliance” is a 
commitment of military support against some external actor(s) and circumstance (Walt, 
2007, p. 157). This has been further specified as a circumstance that furthers respective 
interests (Walt, 2007, p. 157) or against an external threat (Walt, 2009, p. 89). With those 
who postulate that ‘threat’5 is “inseparable” from the concept of an alliance (Gärtner, 2001, 
p. 1). Most fundamentally, however, and for the purposes of this thesis, the concept of an 
alliance is understood to be a formalised grouping of states for the purposes of defence and 
military cooperation in the face of realist threats. These sentiments are echoed across the 
literature on alliances, although it, equally often, includes a wide, and occasionally 
contradictory, array of characteristics. Walt has described alliance arrangements (on 
separate occasions) as resulting from the existence of a formal security treaty, or the 
presence of a significant level of security cooperation (Walt, 1985, p. 34); as well as a 
formal or informal commitment for security cooperation, intended to augment the power, 
security and/or influence of each member (Walt, 2009, p. 86). Likewise, Weitsman and
4 Such as being “a formal or informal relationship of security cooperation between two or more sovereign 
states” (Wilkins, 2012, p. 59). 
5 This thesis examines ‘threat’ in more detail in section 2.4.  
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Modelski have ascribed a formal military collaboration requirement to alliances (1998; 
1963), while Bergsman, and Morgenthau, et al., (respectively) propose the requirements of 
a mutual promise of assistance in the form of substantial resource contributions, and 
explicit agreements, including explicit legal codification (2001, p. 26; 1985). Yet, this 
broad array of conceptualisations only serves to complicate the study of alliances, 
especially as academics have noted that many of these prior understandings were shaped 
before and during the cold war era, which has led to a transformation of ‘threat’ (Brawley, 
2009; Waltz, 2000; Wilkins, 2012; Woodman, 1997). Reflecting this, ‘alignment’, while 
not adopted universally, has been seen by some as both a solution to ‘alliances’ wide range 
of meaning and more reflective of the changing reality of threat and how states themselves 
interact. The following section thereby introduces alignment, and outlines its 
conceptualisation for the purposes of this thesis.    
2.2 Alignments 
 
The tendency for alignments and alliances to be thought of as synonymous or 
interchangeable makes it especially important to understand why a distinction between the 
terms is necessary. So what then, is an alignment? It could perhaps be said that an 
alignment is what an alliance is not, and vis versa. In other worlds, it could be said that an 
alignment is a more informal and flexible arrangement and alliances more formal and rigid 
(Menon, 2007, p. xii). For the purposes of this thesis, an alignment is understood to be an 
informal, flexible cooperation between states in response to matters of shared importance, 
including security concerns as well as realist and non-realist threats. There is, similarly to 
the alliance concept, also a multitude of meanings for alignment, which is made more 
complex as it is often difficult to understand whether the terms are being used 
interchangeably or not6. For the purposes of this thesis, this section only turns to literature 
where it is clear that ‘alignment’ is not being used synonymously for ‘alliance’. 
 
6 Such as this ambiguous description by Walt: “An alliance (or alignment) is a formal (or informal) 
commitment for security cooperation between two or more states, intended to augment each member’s 
power, security, and/or influence” (2009, p. 86). 
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In the literature on alignment, Thomas Wilkins’ ‘Alignment, not alliance’ (2012) article, is 
perhaps the most comprehensive collection of literature on alignment in one short piece. 
Wilkins himself views alignments as being a multi-faceted concept with a number of 
archetypes, of which alliances are “merely one subset” (2012, p. 54), in addition to a wide 
variety of others7. Yet, while Wilkins provides an excellent source to gain a foothold in the 
understanding of an alignment and what makes it different from an alliance, his 
conceptualisations are almost too narrow, and would, in theory, force the naming of yet 
another term if, for instance, an arrangement did not quite fit any of his proposed existing 
archetypes. Seemingly reflecting this issue, most other literature does not break down 
‘alignment’ to such an extent, but rather highlights its relevance in the contemporary era, 
theorizing that it is a response to a move away from the traditional military alliance 
paradigm, which has become more pronounced since the end of the Cold War (Woodman, 
1997, Wilkins, 2012). Thereby reflecting that alignments in turn have turned away from 
more realist notions of threat such as military mobilisations, to a more broad 
conceptualization of threat itself. With alignments incorporating a wider variety of 
originating triggers such as (for example) non-military threats that present a challenge to 
the survival of people and states; such as political, economic, social, and environmental 
threats (such as climate change and resource scarcity) (Martel, 2017, p. 550; Zimmerman, 
2014, p. 151). 
The multitude of conceptualizations of alignment are, in many ways, as broad as those for 
alliances. Volker Krause and David Singer define alignments as “any general commitment 
to cooperation or collaboration […] across a variety of military, economic, political and 
cultural issues, there memberships are likely to be overlapping and cross cutting.” (2001, p. 
16) While Parag Khanna states that “we live in a world of alignment, not alliances” (2008, 
p. 34) and has described aligning nations as “selectively engaging […] in ways that best 
suit their own interests” (2010). While Stephen Walt and Steven R David have been 
paraphrased by Wilkins to conceptualise alignments as relationships “between two or more 
 
7 While Wilkins touches on ‘coalitions’, ‘security communities’, ‘strategic partnerships’, the ‘entente’, the 
‘concert’, and the ‘non-aggression pact’ he notes that there are still others. (Wilkins, 2012, p. 69) 
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states with an expectation of some degree of policy coordination on security issues under 
certain conditions in the future” (2012, p. 56). In contrast to an “alliance” wherein such 
broad understandings of the term has led to contradiction and confusion, the broader nature 
of “alignment” can be seen as being a beneficial and important development that reflects 
the more flexible nature of alignments. Thereby, whereas an alliance can be said to be a 
formalised, inflexible grouping of states for the purposes of defence and military 
cooperation in the face of realist threats, an alignment is an informal, flexible cooperation 
of states that is not limited to defence or realist threat. Understanding alignment as a 
broader concept of which an alliance is a subset, means that the existing explanations of 
alliance formation can be used to explain the more general phenomenon. This possibility 
opens up a rich literature of explanations of alliance – and thereby alignment – dynamics in 
order to also explore alignment dynamics, such as the Quad. In other words, the concept of 
an alignment allows a phenomenon such as the Quad to be studied for the parts of alliance 
theory it includes, rather than having to fulfil, or be rejected, for the de jure or de facto 
aspects of alliances that are present or lacking.  
The conceptualisation of the Quad for this study is one of an alignment, as the Quad can be 
seen as being a more informal, fluid and flexible response to the threats presented by China, 
without being constrained to a military focus – i.e. China still presents a threat although no 
military attack is seen as being imminent by Australia8. While it could be argued that an 
alliance can be understood in a similar way, there is a trend in the literature in which 
alliances are still more formal arrangements, and even in their most “informal” versions 
they are, by definition, more resistant to flexibility (Gärtner, 2001; Morrow, 2000; Menon 
2007). This flexibility of alignments is consistently more present in the literature on 
alignment (Menon, 2007; Snyder, 1997; Wilkins, 2011), wherein to be an informal, 
changing arrangement would not preclude something from being an alignment, while it is 
likely to preclude it from being an alliance. Additionally relevant when looking at a 
 
8 As stated in Australia’s National Security defence update 2007: “As in 2000, Australia does not face any 
direct threat to its territory. But although a conventional attack on Australia seems very remote, we must be 
able to defend ourselves and to be seen by friends and neighbours alike as taking this responsibility 
seriously. (p. 17) 
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phenomenon such as the Quad, is the issue that members themselves are averse to the 
‘alliance’ label (Lee, 2016, p. 30) which can be thought to reflect the international 
ramifications modern (i.e. post-cold war) political leaders believe would follow the 
application of the term “alliance”. This reluctance on the part of policy makers and leaders 
to call the Quad an alliance, regardless of whether the Quad arrangement appears to meet 
all of the criteria, reflects two very relevant sentiments – the first being that  “the very term 
‘alliance’ may be a growing source of strategic misunderstanding” (Tertrais, as cited in 
Wilkins, 2012, p.  54); and secondly, the “stark differences” and gap existing between 
academic insight on alliance theory, and policy maker’s beliefs (Walt, 1990, p. ix). Having 
explained the concept of alignment – in differentiation from the concept of alliance – the 
next section introduces balance of power and balance of threat. 
 
2.3 Explaining alignment: balancing in realist theory 
 
This thesis explores both the concepts of power and threat as well as their respective 
balancing theories in order to provide a deeper understanding of the system-level pressures 
that provide a measure of explanation for alignment formation. While balance of threat may 
be more suitable to the study of the Quad, this thesis first introduces the balance of power 
theory, as it provides the basis from which balance of threat stems and there is degree of 
overlap between power and threat, meaning that an understanding of each is imperative.  
Balance-of-power theory begins with the assumption that states are unitary actors who seek 
their own preservation at minimum, and universal domination at maximum (Waltz, 1979, p. 
118). It posits that the international system is anarchical in nature, which means that it is 
also a self-help system – states must provide for their own security and the means (i.e. 
power) for this security. It is this concern with domination and security that lies at “the 
heart” of balance of power theory (Walt, 1985, p. 5). More specifically, balance of power 
theory postulates that (for example) a singular ‘all-powerful’ state would be representative 
of an imbalance in the international system – i.e. other states could be dominated by that 
singular power. In this hypothetical example, balance of power theory posits that other 
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states would react by allying with each other9 in order to avoid domination by the stronger 
power (Walt, 1985, p. 5). In this context, balance of power literature has typically equated 
the term ‘power’ to mean military capability10 (Hume, 1994; McGowan and Rood, 1975; 
Walt, 1985; Waltz, 2010). A short essay, by Hume, pointed at as being the start of balance 
of power theory in the modern era (Nye, 1990, p. 184), illustrate this equation between 
“power” and military capabilities through its many historical examples11 (1990, p. 154). 
Likewise, Morgenthau has noted that “most of the wars that have been fought since the 
beginning of the modern state system have their origin in the balance of power” 
(Morgenthau, 1978, p. 217).  
Faced with an imbalance of power, understood as military capability, states thereby strive 
to (re-)establish balance. To do so, states typically adopt one of two primary balancing 
strategies: internal balancing efforts (increasing national power and strength i.e. economic, 
military, political, etc.), and external balancing efforts (alignments and alliances [the focus 
of this thesis]) (Waltz, 1979, p. 168). A state increasing its power by either strategy can 
itself then create an additional imbalance of power, which may then also trigger other states 
to take similar actions, regardless of whether they wish to or not. This is because any 
alteration to power distribution (i.e. with the creation of a new alignment or alliance) 
intrinsically shifts the (im)balance of power and states that do not act accordingly to 
(re)balance the distribution of capabilities through the system risk the result of falling 
behind (Waltz, 2010, p. 125-126). It is this preoccupation by states of avoiding 
9 While balancing is states allying against a greater power; an instance where states ally with a greater 
power is known as “bandwagoning”. There are other variations on these as well, such as ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ 
balancing, ‘leash-slipping’ and ‘regional’ balancing (see Walt 2009; Waltz 1979); as well as hedging (see the 
International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 19, no. 3 (2019) special issue on hedging for a deep overview of 
the topic). 
10 It may be more accurate to say that the original focus of balance of power literature was on a state’s 
“warcraft” capabilities – the resources, military power, population, financial and material resources, etc., 
that a state could utilize to for the “art” of war to either dominate or avoid the domination of another state. 
These different aspects of “warcraft capabilities” have, however, been distilled over time to a more general 
“military capabilities”, which still encompasses the non-military resources a state has, but that can be 
purposed towards military might or “power” .  
11 These include an alliance of Asiatic powers arising from a “jealousy” of the increasing force of the Medes 
and the Persians. As well as several other states and entities historically known as being military powers, 
such as Sparta, Alexander, and Hannibal, as being the triggers for other countries coming together to 
“preserve the balance” (Hume, 1994, p. 154). 
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domination and maintaining their position in the system that is the primary motivation for 
the balancing behaviour of states.  
There are a few shortfalls, however, with primarily focusing on military capabilities as both 
the standard of what can be considered “power”, and the primary cause of “imbalance” in 
the international system. As Waltz himself, states: 
Power is no longer ‘homogeneous’ […] Military muscle does not guarantee political 
influence. Economic giants can be militarily weak, and military strength may not be 
able to obscure economic weakness. Countries can exert political influence even 
when they have neither military nor economic strength. (Waltz, 2010, p. 130).  
Waltz also posits that the reality of nuclear capabilities have intrinsically changed the 
balance of world power by raising the bar in terms of the military capabilities that other 
states must obtain to reach the upper echelons of power (2010, p. 181). This correlation 
between nuclear power and power, presents another problem as it indirectly represents 
power as something that can never be lost once a state achieves the nuclear stage, looking 
to Russia, however – widely considered a former superpower – shows this is not at all the 
case. These critiques showcase why framing balancing in terms of power alone, is flawed. 
It is due to these shortfalls that some academics have begun to move away from the balance 
of power theory to balance of threat, which broadens the explanatory available by reflecting 
the more nuanced international relations dynamics of the modern era. The following section 
introduces and provides more insight into both balance of threat, and the concept of threat 
itself.      
 
2.4 From balancing power to balancing threat in realist theory: the role of perception 
 
As mentioned in the previous sections, according to realist theory ‘threat’ has been said to 
be one of the most fundamental causes of alliance or alignment formation (Gärtner, 2001; 
Walt, 2009). The concept of threat in the context of balancing, however, has mostly only 
been taken indirectly into consideration by many theorists, or presented in the context of 
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military force12 (Hume, 1994, Waltz, 2010). In short, whereas Waltz views threat as power, 
and power alone, there are those who suggest that ‘threat’ is a separate and distinct concept; 
and that it is these ‘threats’, and thereby what states perceive as a threat, which are most 
important to alignment formation.  
Walt is an excellent starting point to highlight both the importance of threat, what it is, and 
how perception plays into it. It is important, however, to first begin an examination of 
balance of threat by noting that the theory is essentially a “reformulation” (Walt, 1990, p. 
viii) or “modification” (Priess, 1996, p. 148) of balance of power theory. What is meant by 
this is that balance of threat also contends with the quandary of how states respond to 
imbalances in the international system. It does not challenge the overarching balancing 
theory – that states act to counter imbalances in the international system – but instead seeks 
to expand beyond singularly focusing on the concept of power, and thereby also the role of 
power. Walt postulates that framing balancing in terms of ‘power’ rather than ‘threat’ is 
flawed as it ignores the other factors considered by political figures in identifying potential 
threats (Walt, 1985, p. 8). Thus, according to Walt, “it is more accurate to say that states 
will ally with or against the most threatening power” (emphasis in original) (Walt, 1985, p. 
8-9). Therein, Walt theorises four factors which states take into account when evaluating 
potential threat: 1) aggregate power; 2) proximity; 3) offensive capability; and 4) offensive 
intentions13. The explanations for each are as follows: aggregate power consists of a state’s 
total resources, (i.e. population, industrial and military capability, technological prowess 
etc.); proximity concerns geographic considerations, based on the theory that the ability to 
project power declines with distance, thus closer states are more threatening; offensive 
power is (all else equal) a state’s military capabilities; and offensive intentions concerns 
how aggressive a state is perceived as being (Walt 1985, p. 8-12). These four factors are 
thereby evaluated by states, and in the event of a state essentially ‘perceiving’ a
12 Waltz posits that the more power a state has, the more that state appears as a threat to the others (1979: 
112), implying the importance of threat, but still putting the primary focus on power. 
13 There are two additional points of importance to note with these four factions: 1) it is not necessary that 
each of the four factors are measured as being the same weight or applicability for something to constitute 
a threat, and; 2) as intentions and perceptions are subjective and mutable states may find it safer to balance 
against potential threats, than hope for continued benevolence (Walt, 1985, p. 8-15). 
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threat, a balancing (or bandwagoning14) response is thereby produced; with the assumption 
that the more threatening a state appears to be, the more a balancing reaction is likely 
(Walt, 1985, p. 13). While the first three factors are reflective of realist measurements of 
power considered by other theorists (Gulick, 1955; Harknett and Van Den Ber, 1997; 
Waltz, 2010), Walt’s ‘offensive intentions’ is the primary focus of this thesis in measuring 
Australia’s perception of threat. Thus, the next, most important question is: what can 
offensive intentions be considered to include?  
Walt, and others exploring threat, point to a number of considerations states take into 
account when evaluating the ‘offensive intentions’ (i.e. threat) of another state. These 
generally fall into four primary categories – realist, ideological, economic, and 
environmental (Walt, 1985, Walt 1990, Brauch, 2010). Realist considerations fall into the 
realm of military or Westphalian concerns wherein another state is perceived as posing a 
threat to the territory or sovereignty15 of another state, and which can be both direct or 
indirect (Walt, 1985, p. 30-37). Direct instances of offensive intentions, and thereby threat, 
can be seen in the case of one state attacking, invading, or supporting destabilizing forced 
in another state directly16. Whereas indirect ones can be seen in a situation where a state is 
known to do similarly to other states, and is thus seen as being more aggressive, and 
thereby more threatening, in general17 (Walt, 1985, p. 37). Walt outlines that these may 
either be immediate, as seen with the example of Libya and Colonel Qaddafi or perceived 
having a high level of potential, as seen with his example of the 1907 memorandum on 
British Policy towards Germany by Eyre Crowe (1985, p. 12). In addition to these, more 
subjective or ideological considerations are a part of the evaluation of offensive intentions. 
 
14 While balancing is seen when states ally against a greater power; an instance where states ally with a 
greater power is known as “bandwagoning”, see Walt’s “Alliance Formation and the Balance of World 
Power” for more on bandwagoning. 
15 A number of studies that utilize balance of threat examine cases where armed conflict has or is taking 
place (see (for example): Barnett & Levy, 1991; Gause III, 2003). 
16 This would be the case if (for example) China was perceived as readying itself to invade Australia 
17 This could be considered to be the case in the context of China’s aggressive actions in Hong Kong, the 
South China Sea, Tibet, and a number of other cases. 
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Ideological considerations include political, cultural or other such traits (Walt, 1985, p. 18) 
and states which, for example, fall opposite of another’s ideological spectrum are more 
likely to be perceived as having offensive intentions. That is to say; states with dissimilar 
traits may fear each other more as they may find it easier to imagine being attacked by them 
(Walt, 1985, p. 20) and the existence of the other may inherently threaten their own 
autonomy or authority (Walt, 1985, p. 21). This dynamic has been portrayed in the past 
between, for example, America and communist states such as the Soviet Union. Finally, 
offensive considerations also take into account the importance of the subjective perceptions 
of individual actors, and overarching beliefs. This is to say that if a political figure believes 
that a state has offensive intentions – such as through ideological differences – they will 
view (and act as though) another state is a potential enemy and threat (Walt, 1985, p. 26). 
This dynamic was also highlighted by Waltz, wherein he opined that a country becomes 
what it is treated as (Waltz, 2010, p. 130), therefore, a country is a superpower, or by 
extension a threat, if it is treated like a superpower, or a threat18. Economic and 
environmental considerations on the other hand concern issues such as; poverty, hunger, 
deprivation, economic and market security, as well as water, energy, migration, 
environmental degradation and other issues triggered by a perception of changes to the 
international political order and the global environment (Brauch, 2010, p. 104). 
For the purposes of this thesis, as it is focused on and uses data from Australia’s political 
figures and their outward perspective, ‘offensive intentions’ is instead examined under the 
label of [Australia’s] ‘perception of threat’ – which allows for a more concise 
understanding of what is being analysed19. As such, the Independent Variable of this thesis 
is [Australia’s] ‘perception of threat’ – as it specifically relates to China in the context of 
the types of threat covered in this section (i.e. realist, ideological, economic and 
environmental). While the other aspects of threat proposed by Walt, (aggregate power; 
proximity; offensive capability), are important to an analysis of threat, the quantitative 
 
18 China is an excellent example of this, Nixon spoke of China as both a superpower and an upcoming 
superpower in the 70s, which is a juxtaposition that can still be seen today in the speeches and texts of 
contemporary political leaders.  




analysis these factors would require does not fit within a qualitative study of Australia’s 
perception of threat. Therefore, this thesis will instead look to instances where 
considerations of aggregate power, proximity, and offensive capability are included as 
related mentions or statements in the context of Australia’s perception of China in the texts 
examined. These will then be presented as evidence of threat and outlined in the data 
analysis section of the paper to illustrate that China was a consistently present and 
potentially growing threat during the time in question for this study.  
As outlined previously, there is a line of thought that balance of power is flawed as it 
‘ignores the other factors considered by political figures’ (Walt, 1985, p. 8), yet for all of 
the added perspective provided by balance of threat, it is still focused on system-level threat 
pressures – meaning that balance of threat theory posits that if there is a perception of threat 
at the system-level (i.e. the international system is in imbalance), then states form and/or 
participate in alignments. Such an approach ignores domestic-level pressures – that is to say 
what is happening at the national level – that can impact alignments and their formation. To 
explore the impact of domestic-level factors on alignments by affecting policy makers’ 
calculations of how to response to a perceived imbalance of threat, this chapter now turns to 
approaches that consider domestic-level factors; such as neoclassical realism, which posits 
that such domestic pressures must be brought into focus alongside system-level pressures. 
The following section thereby introduces neoclassical realism and other literature to 
explore the additional explanatory power a consideration of domestic-level factors can 
provide into a study on Australia’s alignment decisions in the context of the Quad.  
 
2.5 Bringing domestic-level factors into realist accounts of balancing 
 
This thesis now turns to an introduction of neoclassical realism and other literature to 
explore the importance of domestic-level factors and how such factors mediate system-
level pressures on the alignment decisions carried out by states. Traditional alignment and 
alliance literature has been primarily concerned with system-level factors; meaning that the 
primary focus is on the balance, or imbalance, of power (Waltz) or threat (Walt) in the 
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international system. Neoclassical realism, however, while beginning with a traditionally 
realist approach to balance of power (Kitchen, 2010, p. 134; Brawley, 2010), (meaning that 
it presupposes the role system-level pressures play in alliance formation), further posits that 
domestic-level factors are an important element that must be included in consideration of a 
state’s alignment decisions (Kitchen, 2010, p. 134; Tang, 2009, p. 799). 
Gideon Rose was the first to propose ‘neoclassical realism’, and the idea that “system-level 
pressures must be translated through intervening variables [the domestic-level factors] at 
the unit level20” (Kitchen, 2010, p. 117). While some scholars posit that such an approach 
sacrifices predictive power of a more general and scalable nature, (Kitchen, 2010, p. 118) 
the more case-specific, exacting nature of neoclassical realism provides an excellent 
resource for exploring and understanding a specific phenomenon (Kitchen, 2010). The 
approach highlights both the complexity of the world, and that events in international 
politics are more likely to mean that alignment or alliance decisions reflect an interaction of 
multifaceted factors and influences. Such as domestic politics, state power and processes, 
the perceptions of Heads of State and Government, and the impact of ideas (Kitchen, 2010, 
p. 118; Tang, 2009, p. 802). Neoclassical realism, thus, provides more descriptive accuracy 
as it allows for a more thorough analysis of human perspectives via political leaders, which 
had been left out of the more traditional realist views on alignment formation (Kitchen, 
2010). To put it more plainly, neoclassical realism posits that system-level explanations for 
alignments, such as an imbalance of power or threat, cannot be considered in isolation, as 
these factors (i.e. power and threat) are mediated by innenpolitik (Kitchen, 2010, p. 119) or 
domestic-level factors, which are themselves the result of human perspective. Thus, 
neoclassical realism postulates that the mediation of these domestic-level variables “have 
the potential to explain ‘why some states act contrary to the structural imperatives of the 
international system’” (Kitchen, 2009, p. 132) and that it “is able to account for grand 
strategic change in an unchanging systemic environment by observing shifts at the unit that 
drive strategic adjustment” (Kitchen, 2009, p. 139). This brings forth the question, 
however, of what domestic-level factors to consider? 
 
20 Unit level being another domestic level consideration (Kitchen, 2010) 
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As noted by neoclassical realist works, there are a “plethora of intervening variables” that 
have been proposed and addressed by this approach (Kitchen 2009, p. 120; Tang, 2009). 
What is common among these, however, is that many of the intervening variables 
considered are reflective of both subjective ideas (or beliefs) and practical realities21 (Beqa, 
2019; Kitchen, 2009; Mclean 2016; Schweller 2004). Domestic level variables have also 
been considered by those outside of the neoclassical realism camp, such as by Barnett and 
Levy, whom have been heavily featured in neoclassical realist works. Thereby, this thesis 
also turns to the variables22 presented in the 1991 work of Barnett and Levy to provide a 
starting post and more exacting structure to the “plethora” of intervening variables posited 
by neoclassical realist scholars, and thus examines ‘the condition of the domestic economy’ 
and ‘electoral concerns’ as the intervening variable of this thesis, termed in combination as 
“domestic-level costs” for the purpose of this thesis, although they are explained separately 
in more detail in the following sections. These have been deemed together “domestic-level 
costs” as they impact the considerations political actors take into account when calculating 
the cost-benefit of whether or not to align. These may, for example, be autonomy costs, 
economic costs, or even political costs, for example, in costing a government its own 
stability or popularity. In this way, it can be said that if domestic-level costs are higher than 
the perception a state has of a threat, it may affect a state’s alignment decisions. 
Barnett and Levy were selected as the starting point for this study because it is the belief of 
this scholar, that their prevalence in neoclassical realist literature illustrates the strength of 
the variables they posit as a starting point, while also being reflective23 of a general 
consensus of the more fundamental aspects that the literature returns to time and again 
when examining which domestic factors are of import. Additionally, while many other 
 
21 This is very poetically put by Kitchen in his article ‘Systemic pressures and domestic ideas’: “the ‘world 
images’ that have been created by ideas have, like switchmen, determined the tracks along which action has 
been pushed by the dynamic of interest.” (2009, p. 129)  
22 These include perceived external threat ; the condition of the domestic economy; the perceived threat to 
domestic stability; and the extent of external alignment (1991, p. 394) 
23 This can be especially seen in work by Randall Schweller wherein the former posits that those at the 
domestic level (i.e. political figures) consider issues such as ‘changes in relative power’ (i.e. the condition of 
the domestic economy) and ‘regime vulnerability and social cohesion’ (i.e. Perceived threat (governmental 
and) domestic stability) in a “causal chain” of how policy changes towards alignments occur (2004, p. 169). 
Perceived threat (governmental and) domestic stability 
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factors might also be important, the economy and electoral concerns of a government affect 
alignment decisions because they directly affect the calculations of decisions makers in the 
form of domestic-level costs of whether or not to align in the face of a perceived threat. 
Thus, this study utilizes a neoclassical realist approach, and examines ‘the condition of 
[Australia’s] domestic economy’ and ‘perception of electoral concerns’, to analyse the 
events from 2007 to 2017 in the context of the Quad and to gain further understanding into 
the dependant variable of this paper: ‘Australia’s alignment decisions’. The following 
sections will explain each of these domestic-level factors as well as how they affect a 
governments choices in alignment decisions in the face of threat.   
2.5.1 The condition of Australia’s domestic economy 
The condition of a state’s domestic economy has been highlighted, directly and indirectly, 
as an important factor in the alignment decisions taken by states in response to a perceived 
threat. In other words, the condition of a state’s domestic economy affects a state’s 
calculations on its alignment decisions in response to a perceived system-level threat. As 
Schweller posits, changes in relative power (as changes in the condition of the domestic 
economy – positive or negative24 – may bring) can be considered an important aspect in 
what he calls the “causal chain” (2004, p. 169) of decision making in the context of 
alignments. Essentially, a state’s domestic economic situation can amplify or restrict a 
state’s inclination to participate in an alignment response, and whether they are able to 
commit to an alignment. In looking to the literature, there are a number of ways in which 
the condition of the domestic economy can have such an impact.  
24 “positive” is meant to mean economic conditions or changes that are seen when an economy is expanding 
– economic growth (i.e. GDP growth and growth potential, rising or high employment, consumer and 
investor confidence, and favorable business environments); whereas “negative” is meant to mean economic 
contraction wherein the opposite tendencies can be seen (i.e. a recession, financial crisis, or falling GDP, 
poor economic forecasts, rising or high unemployment, a depression in consumer and investor confidence, 
and higher than average business bankruptcies or falling entrepreneurialism, which signal unfavorable 
business environments).
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It has been suggested that a negative economic condition discourages participation in 
alignment arrangements in a number of ways. Firstly, a poor economic situation is likely to 
restrict or discourage a state’s alignments decisions (Barnett and Levy 1991; Bran, 1994; 
Stein, 1993). This is evident in alignments that require additional resource costs (such as 
requirements for feeding and housing all the additional personnel or of keeping new 
territories), and those that further negatively impact the long-term strength of a state’s 
economy or the state’s ability to satisfy important domestic welfare targets, which would be 
less alluring to a state. Mature Great Powers for example, (i.e. 1980s America according to 
Arthur Stein) are likely to the face negative economic constraints in their alignment 
decisions, by overextending their commitments to the alignment – both militarily and 
fiscally – to the point wherein this interferes with a state’s ability to act in a way that 
balancing theorists would expect to see (Stein, 1993, p. 99-100). Additionally, a negative 
economic condition may itself trigger a change in the ranking of serious threats or the 
identification of a new threat; as well as the changing of a states “significant auxiliary 
goals” (Kitchen, 2010, p. 138-139) and the means (and methods) that are open for a state to 
achieve these or any other goals. Conversely, a positive economic condition would provide 
a state with the ability to accept alignments that require more military or fiscal 
commitments, but could also allow a state to forgo an alignment arrangement if state 
leaders believe that that the positive economic situation allows the state to be self-reliant 
instead of requiring the alignment to provide the security the state requires (i.e. “if leaders 
believe that economic assets can be converted into military strength quickly” [Brawley, 
2010, p. 5]). 
For the purposes of this study, the statements of the figures included in the study (i.e. the 
Australian public and political and economic / financial sector figures), are taken to indicate 
the actual condition of the domestic economy. One would expect that if there is evidence 
that high-level governmental actors (i.e. Prime Ministers, Ministers, the Treasurer, the Head 
of the Reserve Bank of Australia [a government-banking institution]) perceive the 
condition of the domestic economy to be positive (i.e. growing) or negative (i.e. 
contracting, recessions), then they will act as such. This thesis will thereby examine the 
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economic situation experienced by Australia during the periods under question and look for 
evidence of the condition of the domestic economy influencing Australia’s alignment 
decisions regarding the Quad. If the condition of the domestic economy affects Australia’s 
alignment decisions, one would expect to see a variation over time, wherein faced with an 
external threat a negative perception of the domestic economic condition makes alignment 
less likely, while a positive condition would make alignment more likely. 
 
2.5.2 Perception of electoral concerns  
 
Besides the condition of the domestic economy, and therefore the availability or 
unavailability of resources, another condition that effects a governments calculations in the 
context of alignment action decisions in the face of external threat is the perception of 
electoral concerns. It is important first, however, to understand the context that this is 
understood within. Literature on the influence of domestic-level factors on system-level 
pressures to align often features an examination of ‘domestic stability’ (Barnett & Levy, 
1991; Morrow, 1991; Nathan, 2006. Upon closer inspection, however, it is clear that there 
is a precedent wherein ‘domestic stability’ is often equated with governmental stability and 
what political actors perceive as a threat to staying in power25 – or what can also be 
interpreted as ‘electoral concerns’ (Barnett & Levy, 1991; Levy, 1988, Morrow, 1991; 
Nathan, 2006). Further to this, it is clear that the regime of a state – i.e. non-democracy vs 
democracy – must be taken into consideration, given the variation in what differing regimes 
consider or perceive to be concerning or threatening. A democratic state, for example, 
which has benefitted from the “solidification of the state system” (Barnett & Levy, 1991, p. 
373) would have differing perceptions of, and perceived, threats to their electoral concerns, 
 
25 This parallel is particularly emphasized by Barnett and Levy in which they posit that domestic political 
constraints (such as threats to government rule) may influence political elites as such that they may look to 
external alignments to provide for their own political security (1991, p. 370). Further, they later directly 
equate ‘domestic stability’ with ‘the perceived threats to the government’s political stability’ (1991, p. 379) 
in their exploration of Egypt’s alignment decisions between 1962-1973.      
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than non-democratic states26 (Levy, 1988). Thus, as this thesis examines Australia, a 
modern, democratic state, this study focuses on the perspectives of Australia’s democratic 
government within the context of its ‘electoral concerns’.  
What can be considered an ‘electoral concern’ varies by the agency prescribed to political 
figures, as well as a number of other factors. Streeck and Thelen, (2005), March and Olsen 
(1989), and Schweller (2004) are among those whom point out the agency held by political 
figures is of the utmost importance to a state’s alignment decisions. While, Harknett & 
VanDenBer, are perhaps the most emphatic in their postulation that significant internal 
opposition to a state’s leader (such as low opinion polls, low popularity, attempted ousting 
by their own party, etc.,) may represent the predominate factor motivating alignment 
behaviour (1997, p. 120)27 and, thus, the power of the media, press corps and elections 
themselves on political actors also cannot be understated (Beckmann & Godfrey 2007; 
Chan et al., 2020; and Streeck & Thelen, 2005). Further to this is the thought that the way 
in which the public views political leaders or “shifts in personnel, institutional power, or 
the popularity of particular ideas may precipitate changes” (Kitchen, 2009, p. 139) and that 
any such shifts may originate from, “the bottom up”, such as through bureaucratic leverage 
or election results (Kitchen, 2009, p. 139), or from “the top down, in the form of the 
executive power of patronage and final decision.” (Kitchen, 2009, p. 139). 
In a democracy, there is a connection between winning elections and staying in power. This 
means that electoral cycles also play an important role, as they influence28 when 
incumbents must be (most) concerned with staying in power. Thus, the electoral cycle itself 
can be said to impact the decisions made by political figures. This is reflected in literature 
that theorises that governments, or political figures, are more likely to enact opportunistic 
 
26 In his article ‘Domestic Politics and War’ Jack Levy posits that not being “constrained by a system of checks 
and balances or electoral accountability” leads non-democratic governments to engage in more wars “for 
the most trivial reasons”, implying non-democratic states have a much wider perception of what constitutes 
a threat (Levy, 1988, p. 658).  
27 Both Barnett and Levy, as well as Harknett and VanDenBer study Third World and/or developing countries 
in their analyses of alliance motivations. 




policy changes (and thus also less likely to enact less opportunistic ones) depending on the 
stage of the electoral cycle they are experiencing (Geys, 2007). It has been theorized that 
elected officials act with “opportunistic rather than ideological motivations” (Geys, 2007, p. 
238) ascribed to their primary concern with staying in power. Thus, it has been posited that 
the timing of the electoral cycle can affect political behaviour, decisions and policy making 
(Geys, 2007; Paldam, 1981). Looking to election cycles, in the context of expected 
elections29, there are a number of periods of time that have been examined in terms of 
being influential points. These include the year prior to and immediately following an 
election, (Geys, 2007; Kneebone & McKenzie 2001) as well as more specific “honeymoon 
periods” that range from the first 100 days to first year in office (Beckmann & Godfrey, 
2007; Chan, et al., 2020; Roper & Andrews), wherein a political leader is more likely to be 
able to enact policy changes, and build the profile of their new government – the 
implication being of also highlighting the difference between the new government and the 
old, being (Brommesson & Ekengren, 2013, p. 11; Chan, et al. 2020, p. 1). This means that, 
for example, at the beginning of an electoral cycle, heads of state or government are likely 
less constrained in their decision making, and may feel more able to make unpopular 
decisions – such as (for example) entering an unpopular or exiting a popular alignment. 
While at a later stage in the electoral cycle, especially immediately before an election, they 
are more constrained and less easily able to make unpopular decisions. Likewise, if 
alignment is popular, then it can be considered ‘opportunistic’ as it would bring votes, 
whereas if it were unpopular it is opportunistic not to.    
This thesis thereby examines the alignment decisions taken by political leaders in Australia, 
by looking for evidence of electoral concerns (i.e. staying in power or opportunistic 
decisions) and the timing of actions relating to the Quad. It is expected that a high level of 
electoral concerns, (i.e. unpopularity of actors or decisions, unexpected elections, changes 
in the popularity of policy / foreign policy stances) mediate the pressures of a perception of 
 
29 Geys, (2007) also points out the additional issue of government (in)stability over time (p. 242), such as 
when political parties split, merge, disappear, or change, although does not touch upon the ousting of 
political figures. Geys found that this variable was “extremely difficult” to measure, and focused only on 
expected elections. This is an interesting point of note, however, in systems like Australia’s where elections 
are often called unexpectedly and political leaders are unexpectedly ousted equally often. 
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threat by acting as an intervening variable (along with the economic condition as part of 
domestic-level costs), making alignment (i.e. balancing) less likely. While, conversely, 
evidence of low-level of electoral concerns in the face of threat would indicate that 
alignment is more likely.  
 
2.6 Theoretical conclusions 
 
In order to explain Australia’s pattern of alignment decisions within the context of the 
Quad, this thesis combines balance of threat theory with an examination of the influence of 
domestic-level factors on states’ decisions to balance against threat in the form of 
alignment. Thus, rather than alignment decisions being solely determined by system-level 
factors, such as an imbalance of threat or an imbalance of power (as would be argued by 
Walt and Waltz), this study holds that domestic-level costs significantly shape a 
government’s calculations on whether to align in the face of an external threat.  
Thereby, this thesis posits that a state’s alignment decisions30 (the dependent variable) in 
the face of a perception of threat (the independent variable) are influenced by ‘domestic-
level costs’31 (the intervening variable). While the introduction of domestic-level factors to 
balance of threat theory leads away from a focus of neo-realist alliance theories on system-
level factors such as balance of power (Waltz) and balance of threat (Walt) alone, this study 
remains broadly within the realist tradition by combining the influence of system-level 
 
30 External alignment has acted as both a domestic and system-level variable in previous alignment literature 
(Barnett & Levy, 1991; Adler & Barnett, 1998; Nathan, 2006), with some academics considering whether the 
domestic policies of each individual state align along the same issues, or whether the states are members in 
larger security communities or alliances – such as NATO (Adler & Barnett, 1998). However, academics such 
as  Nathan highlight that the emergence of an alignment is already indicative that the conditions that 
motivate states to adopt similar orientations, and engage in cooperation and policy coordination are already 
in play (Nathan 2006, p. 276), thus, the existence of and/or membership in alignments is more telling than 
coordinating policies between states. This study is in agreement with Nathan’s approach to external 
alignment, as it is whether Australia is “positive” (i.e. in) or “negative” (i.e. out) of the Quad that is of 
primary importance, rather than how it’s policy aligns with the other members at any given time, and 
thereby is presented as a dichotomous variable in this thesis. 
31 As noted in section 2.5, domestic-level costs is an aggregate variable composed of both the ‘condition of 
the domestic economy’ and ‘perception of electoral concerns’. 
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pressures and domestic conditions in a way highlighted by neoclassical realism. Therefore, 
the hypothesis of this paper is that is that, if domestic-level costs are high, a high perception 
of threat does not lead to external alignment decisions, whereas if domestic-level costs are 
low, a high perception of threat leads to external alignment. Meaning that if domestic-level 
costs are high, there is a disruption of balancing behaviour, and it is this which led to 
Australia’s negative alignment decisions, regardless of high perception of threat in 2008. 
The following chapter presents the methodology of this thesis and includes an explanation 
of the case selection, operationalization, as well as the data collection and analysis 
processes used over the course of this study.   
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3. Methodology  
 
The following chapter aims to provide clarification on the case selection, 
operationalization, and data collection and analysis of this thesis. The first part will provide 
an overview of the specifics of the case selection and operationalization, and the latter 
portion will offer insight into the data collection and method of analysis. 
3.1 Case selection 
 
The study consists of a single case study with three within-case observations; Australia’s 
alignment decisions at three separate points in time: during the first formation, the 
cessation, and the reformation of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, comprised of 
Australia, Japan, India, and the United States of America. A case study is a particularly 
good method for testing theories from the literature, and to understand the especially 
complex phenomena that can exist within IR (Bennett & Elman, 2007, p. 171-172).  
The case of Australia in the context of the Quad, may be seen as a deviant case. Qualities of 
a deviant case can be seen in cases wherein outcomes are either different than other similar 
cases, or do not conform to the expectations or predictions that the theory in question would 
lead one to expect (Bennet & Elman, 2007, p. 176-177). Both aspects of deviant cases can 
be seen in this instance. The variation of Australia’s alignment decisions are not reflected in 
the other states, while Australia decided to align with the Quad and took part in the first 
formation of the cooperation during 2007, it reversed that decision 2008 by departing from 
the Quad, and then reverted to its original decision to align again in 2017 – which is 
currently still ongoing. Facing similar system-level pressures as other member of the Quad 
during these periods, but differing from them in terms of response (i.e. the continuity of 
alignment) the case of Australia lends itself to an examination of the impact of domestic-
level variables on system-level pressures on alignment decisions. This study posits that the 
presence of high-level of domestic costs served as an intervening variable and mitigated the 
impact of the system-level pressures, (i.e. a high perception of threat) that are expected by 
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neorealist theory (focusing exclusively on system-level factors) to result in balancing 
behaviour. Thereby, this study examines Australia’s variation in alignment decisions in the 
face of threat, and aims to explain it through the context of the impact of domestic factors 
on alignment formation. This, in turn, will allow an assessment of the relative explanatory 
power of system-level pressures (i.e. balance of power and balance of threat) and domestic-
level costs (i.e. domestic stability and economic conditions) in the alignment decisions of 
states. This section has provided an overview of the reasoning behind the case selection of 
this thesis, and the following section covers the indicators, and values used for the 
operationalization of this study.   
3.2 Operationalization 
 
This section provides more detail on the variables examined within this thesis, as well as 
the indicators and values used to measure these. Information on the data sources follows in 
the next section. In this thesis, the dependent variable (DV) is that of Australia’s alignment 
decisions, while the independent variable (IV) is that of [Australia’s] perception of threat. It 
is expected that while the perceived threat, presented by China, continued to be present and 
high, the presence of high domestic-level costs caused a disruption in what would have 
otherwise led to a balancing reaction (i.e. alignment) (See Figure 1. Table 1). In other 
words; if domestic-level costs are high, then Australia’s alignment decisions will be 
negative, regardless of a high perception of threat. 
   2007 2008 2017-present 
Perception of threat 
(regarding China) (IV) 
High High High 
Domestic-level costs 
(iV) 




(Member of the 
Quad) 
Negative 
(Not a member) 
Positive 




Figure 1. Table 1. 
 
This thesis, therefore, posits that domestic-level costs (the iV) can be used to explain why a 
state’s behaviour (the DV), even in the presence of threat (the IV) can differ from the 
outcome expectations of balance of threat theory (see figure 2).  
 
Figure 2: The hypothesized intervening nature of domestic-level costs on typical balancing 
expectations 
For the measurement of [Australia’s] perception of threat, this study looks for evidence of 
indicators such as the positive or negative mentions of China in the context realist, 
ideological, economic and environmental threats, as well as the other three factors of 
evaluating potential threat as outlined by Walt32. These indicators include the direct and 
implicit use of terms and phrases, ranging from ‘threat’ to ‘friends’, in policy documents 
and speeches concerning China, in the context of both traditional and non-traditional types 
of threat (i.e. military, economic trade, climate change, territorial expansion, human rights 
abuse(s), and in the context of Taiwan, the Dalai Lama, Hong Kong, territorial waters or 
the South China Sea) to measure Australia’s threat perception as representative among 
high-level Australian political figures, analysts and the public or general population. Threat 
perception is found to be high when there is a presence or repeated presence of words or 
 
32 These are based on Walt’s four factors that state take into account when evaluating potential threat: 1) 










phrases that describe China as a direct or potential, challenge, risk or threat to Australia, 
Australia’s interests, the region, or stability in the region concerning Australia. As well as 
words or phrases that allude (directly or indirectly) to a difficult, distrusting, complex, or 
challenging relationship between Australia and China, or evidence of concern with being 
dominated or overpowered or of China contributing to tensions in the regions concerning 
Australia or in Australia’s relationship with Quad allies. Symbolic allusions that associate 
China, or the aggregate power of China, with beings or animals perceived as aggressive or 
overwhelming, such as ‘dragons’; ‘tigers’ or ‘giants’, as well as evidence of Chinese 
influence in an unwanted, illegal, nefarious or ethically dubious way. Threat perception is 
found to be low when the above descriptors or terms are not present and China is instead 
described as a trusted partner, friend, or ally of Australia.     
The measurement of domestic-level costs is broken down into an examination of the 
condition of the domestic economy and electoral concerns. Turning first to the indicators of 
the condition of [Australia’s] domestic economy, this study takes statements of high-level 
political actors to be indicative and representative of the actual quantitative situation, given 
that one can reasonably expect that governmental leaders whom offer their perceptions of 
the economy in positive or negative terms in statements or documents and will similarly act 
in line with their perception. Thus, financial data as well as expert opinions on the 
condition of the economy will be presented to measure the positive or negative condition of 
the economy throughout the time periods included, through the use of indicators that are 
either negative statements or terms, such as uncertainty, recession, downturn, turmoil, 
decline, crisis, contraction, hard, bad, difficult or troubling times; and worsening 
unemployment, consumer confidence or spending. As well as positive statements or terms 
such as GDP or employment growth, ‘booms’ that are economic, financial or sector 
specific, prosperity, and terms that are suggestive of the best (or worst) economic 
conditions in Australia’s history – such as ‘strongest’, ‘weakest’ or ‘historic’.  
Electoral concerns looks to indicators such as popular or unpopular policy changes, 
political posturing, or pandering to specific topics that are controversial, polarizing, in-
demand or unwanted, as well as polling of the popularity / unpopularity of an actor or their 
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actions and decisions. As well as the personal preferences of political leaders themselves 
influencing policy stances or decisions. Also examined is the timing of the electoral cycle, 
and the indicators will be further examined for the period of the electoral cycle they fall 
into. The periods of the electoral cycle are ‘early’ (100 days before and after an election); 
mid (101 days from, until 200 days before an election); and late (201-101 days before an 
election). Actions or decisions taken within these time periods will then be examined in the 
contexts of opportunism or differentiation, such as in having a desirable or controversial 
nature, being seen as popular or unpopular with the populace, or whether prior governments 
avoided them.  
Domestic-level costs are high when there is evidence of negative indicators of both the 
condition of the domestic economy and electoral concerns with the absence of positive 
indicators. It is low when there are is evidence of positive indicators of both the condition 
of the domestic economy and the electoral concerns with the absence of negative indicators, 
and it is medium when there is evidence of positive indicators and negative indicators in 
either the condition of the domestic economy or the Electoral Concerns; but not both at the 
same time. 
Australia’s alignment decisions are a dichotomous variable, as this thesis looks to find an 
explanation for the rationale behind Australia’s decisions to align or not align with (i.e. take 
part in) the Quad. Therefore, Australia’s alignment decisions are ‘positive’ if there are 
indicators of Australia’s participation in the Quad in the context of being a member, or of 
Australia being a founding member or part of the initiative, being “in”, or of the 
progressing, continuing, or deepening of the Quad with Australia’s participation. Indicators 
also include instances where Quad members are reported to be, or perceived as working 
together or taking part in events and formal or informal meetings or exercises, as well as 
any cooperation between the four members aligned with furthering the described goals of 
the Quad, or of deepening the cooperation between all four members. Australia’s alignment 
decisions are ‘negative’ if there is an absence of the above indicators of Australia’s 
participation, as well as evidence of Australia’s departure, leaving, having left, quitting or 
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having quit the Quad. Now having gone over the indicators considered for this study, the 
next paragraph looks to the methods used for analysis.  
The methods used to analyse this phenomenon of interest are those of document analysis 
and qualitative content analysis. Document analysis is the review or evaluation of a wide 
variety of document forms, which is well suited to qualitative case studies as it allows 
research to produce rich and detailed descriptions and interpretations of a case or 
phenomena. Further, document analysis is typically paired with a secondary method, and is 
excellently matched with qualitative content analysis, and allows researchers to provide 
better and more reliable data (Bowen, 2009, p. 28). Such as through triangulation, 
contextualisation, broader insights, or as a part of tracking change and development 
(Bowen, 2009, p. 29-32;). Document analysis, thereby allows for a better understanding of 
the themes and patterns present and identifying whether (for example) perception of threat 
evolves over time, and how or if it is reflected in the sentiments of all levels of government 
figures.  
Qualitative content analysis utilized in addition to document analysis. Qualitative content 
analysis allows for the examination of both latent and manifest meaning (Bengtsson, 2016), 
and the systematic analysis of content for “e.g. who says what, to whom, why, to what 
extent and with what effect” (Bhattacherjee, 2012, p. 115). This is especially important in 
this study, which relies upon the authors interpretation of the perception present in both the 
subjective and objective data analysed. Put another way, Qualitative Content Analysis is a 
good fit for exploring both the tangible concrete data that comes along with financial and 
economic reporting and any outright statements that would indicate perception and external 
alignment. Additionally, qualitative content analysis allows for the exploration of latent 
meaning in the context of what is unsaid, and what was intended to be said, considering the 
context and the circumstances, which is fitting for the more subjective aspects of the study 
(Klotz et al., 2008). This is especially important in the context of this study, wherein the 
impact of changing circumstances and contexts (i.e. yearly changes in domestic-level costs) 
are specifically thought to be a deciding factor in Australia’s alignment decisions. Having 
now explored the indicators, measurements and methods of analysis employed for the 
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purpose of this thesis, the following section details the data collection and sources of this 
study, as well as the coding method utilized. 
 
3.3 Data Collection 
 
This first half of this section introduces the sampling method and data sources, while the 
second half details the coding, coding platform, and coding method of this study. This 
thesis utilizes the principle of the purposeful sampling of sources in relation to gathering 
and selecting the documents for the measurement of indicators of each variable in  2007, 
2008, and 2017. Purposeful sampling involves the identification and selection of groups or 
individuals that can be considered to be experts or experienced with the specific 
phenomenon in question (Creswell & Clark; 2017, p. 235). The documents examined by 
this thesis reflect, produce or give evidence to the views and statements of the public as 
well as high-level actors from the Australian government and other sectors whose roles are 
specifically focused on the variables under examination. This includes (current and former) 
Prime Ministers, Foreign Affairs Ministers, Defence Ministers, figures from the Australian 
Treasury, and high-level actors from the Reserve Bank of Australia, which (while not being 
a wholly government institution) exists to provide financial, banking, and economic 
services to the Australian Government, and also has members of the Australian Treasury on 
its board. Other supplementary data sources included are policy analysts, journalists, and 
economists from trusted and reputable news sources, including the Australian sources such 
as Australian Broadcasting Corporation, The Age, the Sydney Herald, the Diplomat, the 
Monthly and the Financial Review, as well as international ones such as the BBC, the New 
York Times, the Japan Times, and the Economist. Thus, the purposeful sampling method is 
ideal because it allows for system-level comparison and aims for diversity (Barbour, 2008) 
and allows for the possibility for evidence of changes to develop over time. Allowing, for 
example, the exploration of sources wherein there is consistency in terms of the authority 
under which they were given (i.e. documents produced by different actors in the same 
positions over different periods i.e. Prime Minister Howard in 2007, Rudd in 2008, and 
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Turnbull in 2017) as well as the subject or occasion. Thus, the data analyzed for the 
purposes of this study includes texts and documents such as speech transcripts, press 
releases, debate transcripts, interview transcripts, as well as policy documents and policy 
papers, such as defence white papers and defence reports. The timeframe of the materials 
examined for each period (i.e. 2007, 2008 and 2017) is that of year in question as well as 
the one prior and following, with the exception of retrospectives specifically written about 
Quad, the global financial crisis, or electoral concerns / Australian political leader’s 
perceptions of China during the periods under examination. This study also includes 
economic reports; as well as popular press, media pieces, opinion pieces, and transcripts of 
events covered by Australian media, selected for their timeliness or relevance. Meaning that 
they were selected due to being written by high-level political leaders (i.e. former prime 
ministers), or directly concern the Quad or the other subjects included previously. These 
data and sources were systematically gathered through a comprehensive search of 
keywords (i.e. the Quad, China, threat, challenge, global financial crisis, etc.), as well as by 
following the documents referenced in the examined data. Now that the data sources 
examined have been described, the next paragraph covers the coding process that was used 
for analysis. 
A lean, “splitter” method of coding was used via the Dovetail coding platform. The coding 
process was developed gradually, first finding a selection of primary data, forming the 
preliminary categories based on said data, and then progressing to new data and the 
formulation of new codes, as per the premise of the grounded theory research method. 
Thus, the data was collected and explored through an initial open coding with tentative 
categorical links (Willig, 2013, p. 72), and thereby, the first step was of an initial 
categorisation of four broad terms that specifically related to the phenomena under 
question: the Quad, China, the economy, and government. Following this, while scouring 
the data, several commonly occurring references and themes – such as threats, regional 
stability, economic growth and the global financial crisis, and others, became apparent. 
These were then considered for their frames of reference: positive, negative or ambiguous. 
Meaning, for example, China in the context of the theme of ‘threat’ could be observed in 
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positive references, such as cooperative or friendly terms and phrases33; or negative 
references, such as text that either alluded to, or outright belayed, fear, anxiety or 
challenges as well as directly deeming something a traditional or non-traditional threat34. 
Ambiguous references were those that were neither positive or negative, but could be 
construed as either, and were thus important because they represented a preoccupation with 
the topic (i.e. China or the Quad) under examination35. 
33 Such as: “[w]e will continue to work with China to encourage it to take a responsible role” (Downer, 2017). 
34 Such as: “The rapid rise of a new power, be it modern China or ancient Athens, creates anxiety” (Turnbull, 
2017); “‘There has been foreign interference in Australian politics’ […] Chinese influence on [Australian] 
domestic politics” (Gribbin, 2017). 
35 Such as: “China has gained the most from peace and harmony in our region and consequently it has the 
most to lose if it is threatened”  (Turnbull, 2017). 
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4. Perception of threat, domestic-level costs, and Australia’s alignment decisions 




This chapter brings forth the empirical data explored to analyse the factors which are 
thought to have determined Australia’s alignment decisions with regard to the Quad, 
specifically focusing on the years of: 2007, 2008, and 2017. The focus of the analysis is on 
how domestic-level costs – the perception of condition of the domestic economy and 
electoral concerns – have affected the Australian government’s decisions in terms of 
whether to align (in the form of the Quad) in response to the presence of China as a threat. 
For this purpose, this chapter explores Australia’s decisions at all three moments of 
observation. Beginning in 2007, this section presents the empirical data on (Australia’s) 
perception of threat, Australia’s alignment decisions, then the perception of the condition of 
the domestic economy and electoral concerns, before going on to do the same for the 
periods of 2008 and 2017. 
   
4.2. The first iteration of Australia’s alignment with the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue: 
2007 
 
Australia’s perception of threat - 2007 
 
This section presents the level of Australia’s perception of threat towards China in 2007. In 
this time period Australia’s perception of threat in the context of China is clearly present. 
Growing concern due to China’s rise in the context of changing regional and global power 
dynamics provide evidence that there is a perception of threat present among Australian 
political leaders that, while not alarmist, suggests a level of immediacy in how Australia 
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must respond to threat from China. This can be seen in the presence of indicators of high-
level of threat perception that ascribe China as being dominating, critical, and contributing 
to the threat of regional instability, as well as military and climate change threats.  
Australia’s Minister for Defence writes in the 2007 Australian National Security Defence 
Update: “the strategic landscape is shifting [in the Asia-Pacific][…] At the same time, we 
are contending with instability in our immediate region” (Australia, p. 7, 2007), and later 
details that: 
China’s emergence as a major market and driver of the economic activity […] has 
benefited the expansion of economic growth […] But the pace and scope of its 
military modernisation, particularly the development of new and disruptive 
capabilities such as the anti-satellite (ASAT) missile (tested in January 2007) could 
create misunderstandings and instability in the region. (Australia, p. 19, 2007). 
Providing evidence of a concern with China’s aggregate power as well as proximal factors 
for Australia in terms of its surrounding region. Additionally, a retrospective specifically on 
the subject of the Quad, by Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd36, refers to the 2007 
formation of the Quad as “a classic geostrategic tool of ‘offshore balancing37’ against 
Beijing […] implying China back in 2007 had already become a threat to the order” (Rudd, 
2019). At another level of government, Alexander Downer, a Minister for Foreign affairs 
describes the relationship between the Australia and China as conflicting with a diplomatic 
descriptor and frames China as a potentially dominating power:  
We have a good modus vivendi38 with China. We have very different political 
systems and historical traditions, but we need to work with them. Having said that, 
 
36 Kevin Rudd was the Prime Minister of Australia from the latter half of 2007 to 2010 and again in 2013. 
37 Offshore balancing has been called a grand strategy, wherein a great power utilizes regional powers to 
check the rise of potentially-hostile powers. It has been typically associated with the United States of 
America. (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2016; Switzer, 2016) 
38 The term “modus vivendi” (emphasis in original) (Downer, 2007), which itself is Latin for an arrangement 
that allows conflicting parties to coexist. 
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we don't want to be dominated by any one power. (emphasis in original) (Downer, 
2007).  
This sentiment of a conflicting, or difficult relationship in the context of contrasting 
ideological differences is also seen repeated in the words of Prime Minister Howard. While 
he does not use the same terminology, he makes it clear that while he has focused on 
building a close relationship between Australia and China, any relationship that exists 
between the two is, and will always be, a wary (i.e. distrustful) one: 
In relation to China, Australia, as you know, has striven over the last decade to 
build a very close relationship with China. But we've always done it against a 
background of being realistic about the nature of political society in that country. 
We have no illusions that China remains an authoritarian country. (Cheney & 
Howard, 2007)  
Likewise, there is evidence of a wider concern with domination as other levels of 
government as well. A report on a 2007 Parliamentary Questionnaire purposed towards 
gaining a deeper understanding of Australia-China relations highlighted the thoughts of a 
number of Australian MPs. Included in the report of survey responses was one which 
opined that “the growing power of China will change the geo-political power relationships 
in this region and Australia may find China demanding that Australia follow their policy 
objectives in the future” (Parliament of Australia, 2009, p. 120). Suggesting that concern 
with a dominating China is not restricted to those at the highest-levels of government.  
This continued presence of a China-centric threat can also be observed in the context of 
China’s impact on Australia’s economic condition and climate change. This can be fairly 
widely observed in the 2007 documents and texts39 regarding China by Prime Minister 
John Howard40. In some cases at the same time, wherein it is posited that not holding 
China 
39 For example, such as that industrial investment would leave Australia for China if China was not held to 
the same standards regarding avoiding climate change as Australia (see: Howard, 2007e; Howard, 2007f; 
and Howard, 2007g).   
40 It has been noted by those who have researched Australia-China relations that Prime Minister John 
Howard, and indeed many Australian governments that “the question how to strategically depict China and 
its threat potential without arousing Chinese hostility or suspicion has been a taxing issue […] but, at the 
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to the same climate standards as Australia would both ruin the environment, and also 
encourage companies to depart Australia for China for the laxer standards (Howard, 2007e) 
(implying that laxer standards equal economic implications). Indeed, Mr. Rudd also notes 
in other documents that “the rise of China” has a huge impact (“these global factors impact 
hugely” (Howard & Rudd, 2007)) on Australia, both directly and indirectly. Such as 
through Australia’s economic condition and climate change:  
And invest also to make sure that we are dealing with the critical challenges of 
climate change […] You’ve got to have an international agreement that includes 
both the Americans and the Chinese and the Indians, because they are the major 
emitters. I mean, by the year 2030, what, something like two-thirds of the world’s 
emissions will be coming from the developing countries, or close to that […] I agree 
with [Mr. Howard] on one point that he’s just made. And that is that China is 
critical. (Howard & Rudd, 2007)  
The texts and documents from and regarding the 2007 time period paint a complex picture 
in the context of Australia’s threat perception of China. This finding from primary sources, 
is also in line with the observation of a number of academics that China has been one of the 
greatest potential modern threats to the defence and security of Australia (McDowall, 2009, 
p. 85). As included throughout the body of this section, there is evidence that there is a high 
perception of threat in the context of China in the presence of indicators that ascribe China 
as dominating, critical, and contributing to instability and climate change threats. 
Therefore, it can be said that the evidence of a high-level of perception of threat would 
support an expectation of balancing behaviours by Australia according to balance of threat 
theory and a focus on system-level pressures; i.e. in a vacuum of a high-level of domestic 
costs.  
Australia’s alignment decisions – 2007 
 
 
same time, growing tension  in Australia’s foreign policy between economic interest (China) and security 
interest (the United States) is observable” (McDowall, 2009, p. 1 ). 
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Having found evidence of a high-level of perception of threat in 2007, this section turns to 
mentions of the existence and activities of the Quad as an indicator of Australia’s alignment 
decisions. The documents and texts examined include a number of  direct statements, from 
a variety of levels of actors reflecting Australia’s participation in the Quad in 2007, which 
are both retrospective and from written during the period itself.  
In a retrospective, Prime Minister Kevin Rudd, who served from the end of 2007 to 2010, 
directly overlapping the first tenure of the Quad examined its existence and development 
over each three periods – 2007, 2008 and 2017. Looking back to the Quad, what Rudd 
calls, “Quad Mark 1” (Rudd, 2019) the former PM notes that “one of the core questions in 
capitals back in 2007-2008 was where in fact did Abe intend to take the Quad over time?” 
(Rudd, 2019) and remarks that “I was directly involved in this important debate” (Rudd, 
2019). As well as statements by those in the media: “[y]ou might remember this 
[quadrilateral] dialogue came out of the ASEAN Regional Forum session in May last year” 
(Doogue, 2008); “the four powers set up the initiative (informally named the Quad) in 
Manila last May” (Ali, 2007); and the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Defence; “the 
quadrilateral security dialogue which was part of the Howard government’s initiatives” 
(Bishop, 2017). These statements reflect that there is a shared consensus by those at a high-
level of the Australian government that Australia was indeed a participant in the Quad 
during 2007.    
Additional evidence of Australia’s alignment decisions being positive within the 2007 
period include numerous statements and reports of events occurring within the context of 
the Quad and of China’s concern with the grouping. These are primarily found in the texts 
and documents of policy analysts and journalists: 
A so-called quadrilateral dialogue among officials from the United States, Japan, 
Australia and India was held last year, much to China's concern […] [a] tentative 
first meeting was held on the margins of a regional forum in Manila last May […] 
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even this was too much for Beijing. It issued diplomatic protests demanding to 
know what the talks were about (Medcalf, 2008).41  
Multiple sources also bring forth evidence for the Quad through China’s preoccupation 
with the grouping, although there is no direct mention of China in materials on the Quad 
from 2007. There is, however, an emphasis on encouraging openness and transparency, 
human rights, as well as freedom, and the “imperative” need to deepen the relations of 
democratic nations within the region (Abe, 2007). These traits, the opposite of which (i.e. 
non-transparency, non-democratic, human rights abuses, restricted freedoms and openness) 
are often associated with China, do suggest an underlying anti-China sentiment in the 
purpose of the Quad (Jain, 2008). Additionally, analysts inside and outside of Australia 
noted that Australia’s participation in the Quad denoted a signalling of a negative turn in 
Australian policy towards China, and that: “They [China] see this as a pattern in which the 
US and Japan have been trying to consolidate an alliance of democracies in Asia, which 
they feel is directed against them” (Nicholson, 2007). This sentiment of repeatedly evident 
in materials from 2007: “the newly launched Australia-India-Japan-U.S. ‘Quadrilateral 
Initiative’ has raised China’s hackles, but its direction is still undecided owing to differing 
perceptions within the group over what its aims and objectives ought to be” (Chellaney, 
2007). This was met by diplomatic protests and lobbying from China for the 
discontinuation of the Quad. 
China was concerned enough by the Quad to take punitive retributive action, which was 
reported by multiple Australian sources: “Chinese authorities have issued formal diplomatic 
protests to Australia, the US, Japan and India” (Nicholson, 2007). “Reports of protests, sent 
by China to Australia, and Australia’s attempts to reassure China of the purpose of the 
Quad (as opposed to Australia attempting to showcase a lack of participation) provide 
further confirmation of Australia’s decision to align with the group. It was also reported 
that “diplomats lodged protests, demanding an explanation of the mysterious talks […] 
 
41 In 2007, policy analysts and journalists also noted that Quad members brought their navies together for 
shared exercises (Medcalf, 2007; Ali, 2007); but that the events of the Quad were being kept quiet “so as not 
to upset the world’s largest autocratic state, China.” (Chellaney, 2007). 
50 
 
these demarches came with petty punishments, such as visa trouble for an Indian delegation 
due to visit China, and hints of worse to come” (Medcalf, 2008b). These multiple instances 
of confirmation provide evidence that Australia was a member and participant of the Quad. 
This means that in 2007 Australia decided to align with others in the format of the Quad. 
This decision can be seen as in line with the system-level pressures described in the 
previous section. Nevertheless, the following sections will provide insights into the 
domestic-level conditions prevailing at the time.   
Condition of Australia’s domestic economy – 2007 
 
Whereas the previous sections explored system-level pressure (perception of threat) as well 
as Australia’s alignment decisions, the following two sections turn to the domestic levels, 
and explore the level of domestic costs in 2007 – economic and political – that coincide 
with Australia’s decision to join the Quad. In an examination of the data from 2007, it is 
clear across all of the documents that the Australian domestic economy is positive, 
growing, or “booming” in 2007 (Edey, 2007; Howard, 2007a); and thus the condition of 
Australia’s domestic economy would not have contributed to a high-level of domestic 
costs.  
The year 2007 is especially interesting given that a global recession (also called the global 
financial crisis or GFC) occurred in 200842. Thus it would not be unreasonable to expect to 
see indicators of the future recession for Australia looming just ahead, yet this is not the 
case. A speech by Reserve Bank of Australia’s senior executive and Assistant Governor 
remarks on the “downturn in the US housing sector” but specifically notes that “at this 
stage, the overall slowing in the US economy has been very mild, and the housing 
downturn so far has not caused any major disruption to the rest of the economy” (Edey, 
2007), further stating that “the short-term outlook for the world economy looks like it will 
be favourable to further growth in Australia […] Longer term forces […] [have] given 
 
42 While the global financial crisis is generally seen as occurring in 2008, signs of a recession, such as 
contracting economies, falling employment, and trouble in the housing market began in some parts of the 
world as early as 2007 (Flannery, Simon & Mahendrarajah, 2013; Erkens, Hung & Matos, 2012). 
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significant boost to aggregate incomes and spending.” (Edey, 2007). Additionally, the 
Australian Treasury also recognised the “turbulence” that was occurring in the United 
States (the future global financial crisis), but predicted positive future growth if the 
situation “continues to be resolved in a relatively benign fashion, stronger outcomes are 
possible for the domestic economy.” (Australian Government The Treasury, 2007, p. 2) 
This means that there is evidence that the GFC had not reached Australia in 2007, and that 
state leaders within Australia were expecting continued growth in the following year. 
Positive representations of the condition the Australian domestic economy are found 
delivered by a variety of sources and actors at all levels of the private and public spheres in 
2007. In an election debate43 – occurring in late October 2007 – the moderator reflected 
that “most people would agree the economy is in pretty good shape”; while the debate itself 
has over a dozen references to Australia’s “current prosperity” and “current [economic] 
boom” spread across each speaker (Howard & Rudd, 2007). Additionally, John Howard’s 
speech to Perth’s Chamber of Commerce and Industry could not portray the Australian 
economic situation in 2007 in a more positive manner: 
Although we live in great economic times, we also have pressures, all economies 
have pressures. Fortunately the pressures we have the moment are the pressures of 
prosperity […] The great economic conditions we have the present time are a 
combination of circumstances […] This is the strongest economy Australia has 
had since World War II. (Howard, 2007a) 
During 2007, Prime Minister Howard refers to the positive condition of Australia’s 
domestic economy repeatedly, in a variety of ways – such as with repeated references to a 
“booming economy” (Howard, 2007h); “booming job market” (Howard, 2007j); and “great 
economic prosperity” (Howard, 2007j). Texts by the Rudd government in the same period, 
are not as effulgent, but this is likely due to the fact that Prime Minister Rudd was not very 
prolific during the period. Indeed, where Prime Minister Kevin Rudd does talk about the 
43 The only one that occurred during the course of the 2007 Australian election. 
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economy in 2007, his portrayals invoke a feeling of ‘business as usual’ (see: Rudd, 2007a; 
Rudd, 2007b; Rudd, 2007c)– which provides additional indication that the GFC was not a 
key talking point in the period under examination. 
Additional positive portrayals are also seen echoed across governmental sectors. In an 
address on the economic conditions and prospects of Australia, a Governor of the Reserve 
bank of Australia notes: 
The last time I gave a speech in Brisbane was three years ago, in June 2004. The 
key themes of that address were […] an Australian economy enjoying a long 
expansion, and a Queensland economy growing faster than the national average. 
You might be forgiven for saying that not much has changed in the interim. 
(Stevens, 2007).  
While the Assistant Governor of the same institution notes a similarly positive assessment:  
The Australian economy has had a lengthy period of expansion. By past standards, 
we have had reasonably stable growth and low inflation, and the economy has 
moved closer to full capacity. The short-term outlook for the world economy looks 
like it will be favourable to further growth in Australia. (Edey, 2007) 
What comes across in the texts from 2007 is a consistent message that the condition of the 
domestic economy in Australia is perceived as positive or “good” (i.e. growing and 
expanding) by the political elites of the country. This suggests that political figures who 
would take part in alignment decisions, would have had the same perception. As a final 
note on the condition of the economy in 2007, there is a remarkable positivity that comes 
across in the documents from this year. The speakers and reports from 2007 are 
consistently positive, almost extremely so, even when looking at the more formal reports 
and documents. This is important when looking to the data for the following years, as 
although the speakers and formats of overviews remain similar the content and tone 
changes to a dramatic extent. As such, the evidence makes it clear that, for the year 2007, 
the perception of the condition of Australia’s domestic economy is ‘positive’. As such, the 
positive economy would not have posed any constraints on Australia’s alignment decisions. 
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Australia would neither have been concerned with having to spend needed resources as part 
of the alignment commitment, nor be concerned with economic backlash from China. 
Having examined the condition of Australia’s domestic economy, the next section moves to 
an examination of the perception of electoral concerns in the same period. 
 
Perception of electoral concerns – 2007 
 
Turning to the next domestic-level factor, this section explores the perception of electoral 
concerns in the 2007 time period and its impact on Australia’s alignment decision. It is 
notable that 2007 was an election year, and that John Howard was running for what would 
have been his fifth term in office (Johnston, 2007) against opposition Labor Leader Kevin 
Rudd. The election itself was expected, (i.e. it was at the end of the completion of a regular 
term in office) and texts that are either pro-own party or anti-opposition party are, as could 
be expected, fairly spread out over the year, and representative of a variety of actors. These 
include texts by the Minister of Foreign affairs: ‘Who would lead Australia’s foreign policy 
under a Rudd government?’ (October 2007); ‘Kevin Rudd’s Vote of ‘No Confidence’ in his 
own team’ (June 2007); as well as speeches: ‘A Narrative of Success’ (January 2007), and 
media sources.  
While the election itself was expected, the data evidences that it was a difficult election 
fight for the incumbent leader. Prime Minister Howard himself described the 2007 election 
as: “this is the toughest election I have had in the last decade or more … The longer you're 
in office the tougher it is” (Howard, 2007b).While a number of media and academic 
sources highlight that the Prime Minister had been consistently polling behind his opponent 
“All polls for a year before the election pointed to a Labor victory” (Bongiorno, 2008, p. 
591); while a late, sole election debate was also viewed by media sources and the public to 
be a loss for Prime Minister Howard, (Grattan, 2007; Murphy & Schubert, 2007). This loss 
of popularity by Mr. Howard was observed in the data as reflecting the suggestion that 
voters were “ready for a change” (Johnston, 2007; “Howard, Rudd differences in 
spotlight”, 2007). With Mr. Howard being seen as being out of touch with voters, and 
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specifically unpopular with Chinese-Australians, with the implication that Mr. Howard’s 
tougher stance on Asia and Asian migrants was stirring racial divisions in Australia 
(Coorey, 2017; Perry, 2007). On this, Mr. Rudd can be seen to highlight that particular 
difference, showcasing his own interest in China and describing himself as an “unemployed 
diplomat who speaks Chinese” (Howard & Rudd 2007) during the election debate. This 
showcases a more direct connection to Chinese-Australians, and potentially China itself, 
early on through a potential Rudd victory. Mr. Rudd playing up his personal connection to 
China suggests a level of opportunism in his electoral campaign, wherein he would be less 
likely to take alignment decisions or other policy approaches that would alienate China.  
This difference in approaches can be seen throughout the material relating to the election 
from this time period. In their respective speeches before the election, Prime Minister 
Howard highlights the important relationship between Australia and the United States in 
the context of calling them “our great ally” (Howard, 2007d). While also highlighting his 
(Howard’s) work in foreign policy that allowed Australia to overcome “opponents” in the 
“leaders of Asia” (Howard, 2007d) implying that this has led to fruitful economic 
advantages for Australia. In contrast, Mr. Rudd distances himself from America by 
highlighting Australia’s need to exit Iraq, and offers a multitude of changes and 
emphasizes: “[a]fter 11 years Mr. Howard has become stuck in the past. He simply doesn’t 
understand the new challenges that we face in the future […] The challenge of the rise of 
China and India. (Rudd, 2007a). 
This divide, that Mr. Howard presents ‘more of the same’ and that Mr. Rudd presents an 
introduction of change is also a consistent thread throughout the time period in the texts and 
transcripts of the candidates themselves. That is to say, that there is repeated evidence of 
Mr. Howard expressing the sentiment that he ‘knows’ what is needed for Australia, and will 
continue to deliver along the same lines as he has previously: “No, no sensible conservative 
people, they would understand me, they would understand because it’s their view” 
(Howard, 2007c); “I know the politics of just about every seat in this country I understand 
that and people will say that” (Howard, 2007b). While Mr. Rudd poses himself as someone 
to challenge the ‘status quo’:  
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The way forward for Australia is to elect a new Prime Minister and a new 
government with fresh ideas to meet the challenges of the future […] Australia 
needs new leadership with fresh ideas for the future.  (Rudd, 2007a) 
This sentiment is also visible in the election debate where Mr. Rudd and Mr. Howard 
express polarized views on some of the most controversial issues in Australia at the time 
(i.e. climate change, taking troops out of Iraq, and the ‘apology’44 issue) (Howard & Rudd 
2007). Thus, looking to the data, it is clear that Mr. Rudd is clearly pushing for more 
enacting more changes than Mr. Howard should he win the election (Howard & Rudd 
2007). 
The data from 2007 can be seen as providing confirmation to the thought that heads of state 
and government are perhaps the most powerful forces in shaping policy (Streeck & Thelen, 
2005; March & Olsen, 1989; Schweller, 2004). While the election of 2007 may first come 
across as evidence of a perception of electoral concerns, it cannot be considered as such 
because no evidence can be seen as to suggest that the election caused any change in the 
alignment decisions of Mr. Howard. Rather, the evidence found suggests that the election 
encouraged Mr. Howard to commit more to what he was already engaged in or with, i.e. the 
Quad. Suggesting that, had he not lost the election, the Quad may have continued, but this 
is pure speculation. Rather, what comes across from the data in 2007, is that the direction of 
the Prime Minister is an important aspect to consider in a state’s alignment decisions than 
simply the existence of an election. Therefore, the perceived threat to Australia’s 
(governmental and) domestic stability cannot be seen as contributing to the domestic-level 
costs of 2007. This is because, regardless of the election, Mr. Rudd was unable to begin 
enacting any changes until the following year, and Mr. Howard cannot be seen to have been 
influenced by the election in a way that suggests that he would have changed his pre-
existing stances and direction in the context of Alignment decisions. 
 
44 The ‘apology’ issue has been a long standing controversial subject in Australia. It refers to the polarized 
opinions held in Australia on whether the government should apologize to the Indigenous peoples of 
Australia for past actions such as forced assimilation and removal of children from their parents. More 




Summary – 2007 
Looking to the events of 2007, there is clear evidence of Australia’s decision to align 
through its participation as a member of the Quad; as well as a high perception of threat 
regarding China and low domestic-level costs. The latter being reflected in the indicators of 
a perception of a ‘good’ domestic economic condition, and electoral concerns that suggest a 
further commitment to alignment rather than the converse. This reflects the theoretical 
expectations of balance of threat, and the hypothesis that an absence of domestic-level 
factors in the face of system-level threat leads to alignment.   
 
4.3 The cessation of the Quad - 2008 
 
Australia’s perception of threat - 2008 
 
The following section examines Australia’s perception of threat in the context of China for 
the year of 2008. The year 2008 was markedly different from that of 2007 in that 
perception of a threat from China is more direct. There is still evidence of concern with the 
threat of China in the context of climate change threats, but there is also more evidence of a 
perception of threat in Australia’s increased concern with China’s military spending, power 
shifts, and regional instability.  
Documents from across multiple levels of Australian government provide evidence of these 
concerns. A connection between the threat of China and climate change, the latter which 
Rudd calls “nothing less than a threat to our people, our nation and our planet.” (Rudd, 
2008f) can be seen repeatedly in speeches by the Prime Minister from 2008. The Prime 
Minister underlines that China presents a threat in a number of contexts: “Multilateral 
action with China on climate change is also a major challenge” (Rudd, 2008e); “How could 
it be that we pioneered breakthrough solar technology in Australia and the previous 
government sat idly by while we lost that technology to China.” (Rudd, 2008f). While Mr. 
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Rudd also offers a retrospective assessment pointing to the 2009 Australian Defence White 
Paper (written in 2008), which “explicitly named China's expanding military budget and its 
unexplained regional deployments” (Rudd, 2019) as the reason for Australia’s own 
increased military spending. Mr. Rudd implies that this increased military spending was the 
direct result of a perception of a high-level of perception of threat in stating that this same 
white paper was “that blunt in identifying the emerging China challenge”45 (Rudd, 2019), 
which can be taken as evidence of a continued concern in Australia with a potential threat 
involving China.  
Stephen Smith, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade of the 2008 Rudd government, 
highlights a number of “international security challenges” (Smith, 2008b, p. 1) facing 
Australia, and in a section on the tensions arising over contested areas in the East China 
Sea, states: “Our region still contains potential security flashpoints, where political 
miscalculations of adventurism could have dramatically adverse consequences for Japan, 
Australia and our region as a whole.” (Smith, 2008b, p. 15). The Foreign Affairs and Trade 
minister also touches upon changing power shifts in the region and China’s military 
spending: “the global strategic balance is changing. Two of the world’s largest military 
forces, China and India, are in Asia.” (Smith, 2008b: p. 10). Sentiments reiterated in a 
speech on Australia, ASEAN and the Asia-pacific:  
East Asian46 military spending alone is now equivalent to that of all the European 
NATO countries combined […] world economic and political influence continues 
its inexorable shift to Asia […] the challenges we face are substantial […] shifts in 
the distribution of strategic, economic and military influence within the 
international system. (Smith, 2008d). 
Statements reflecting a preoccupation with China’s role in changing or shifting power and 
influence are also seen at other levels as well. Australian Prime Minister Rudd also notes 
 
45 In the text the use of ‘that blunt’ suggests that it is referring to the explicit naming of China’s expanding 
military budget. 
46 Looking to literature on the topic available from Australian Parliament, “East Asia” includes China, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan – but not India. 
(Emmers and Ravenhill, 2011; Frost, 2009; Toll, 1994) 
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this change or shift in global power: “there are still many problems in China […] China's 
change is having a great impact not just on China, but also on the world […] The scale and 
pace of China's economic development and social transformation is unprecedented in 
human history.” (Rudd, 2008d). As does the Australian Department of Defence in its 
description of China being “one of two of the most important powers of the next fifty 
years” (Fitzgibbon, 2008a); and the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade who describes 
China as an “emerging, great power” (Smith, 2008e). Alluding repeatedly to changing 
power dynamics provides evidence that Australian political figures are preoccupied with 
the question of what these changes mean to Australia and its allies.  
The data presented above regarding Australia’s continued preoccupation with China in the 
context of its role in global warming, potential for instability and changing global power 
dynamics and an increased concern with China’s military spending, provides evidence that 
there was a high-level of perception of threat in the 2008 period, this means that it can be 
expected that Australia would remain committed to external alignment. Yet, Australia’s 
decision in 2008 is to distance itself from the grouping, which is counter to balancing 
theory expectations, thus the next section examines Australia’s alignment decisions and the 
ways in which the domestic-level costs under consideration could have impacted this.  
Australia’s alignment decisions – 2008 
 
Having found evidence of a high-level of perception of threat in 2008, this section presents 
the finding of Australia’s alignment decisions in the context of alignment in the face of a 
high-level of threat. While mentions of the Quad in 2007 were primarily infrequent and 
indirect, the Quad, and Australia’s decision to depart from it, is mentioned directly and 
indirectly much more in 2008. Supporting the fact that Australia decided not to continue 
their alignment with the Quad in 2008 no events were planned nor took place under the 
Quad cooperation. Thus, this section focuses on the texts and documents that provide 
evidence of Australia’s decision not to align. This is both in terms of distancing from it and 
reasons for its eventual end.  
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In a retrospective article, Mr. Rudd notes that it was made clear that Australia would not be 
continuing its participation in the Quad in approximately March 2008; “That brings us to 
the United States. As Prime Minister, I visited Washington in March 2008 just after we had 
made clear that we would not be continuing Australian participation with the Quad.” 
(Rudd, 2019), creating a timeline of the decision at the highest level of Australian 
Government. The Australian Foreign Minister, however, made it clear that it was his belief 
that Australia would not be part of the Quad as early as the first week of February 2008; 
“One of the things which caused China concern last year was a meeting of that strategic 
dialogue […] but we're not proposing to have a dialogue along the lines as occurred last 
year” (Smith, 2008). This mention of the Quad and China’s opposition of it, and thus the 
connection between the two is a common thread, however, no direct statement of 
explanation has been given for leaving the Quad in 2008. There is, however, a general 
belief by analysts, political figures and those in the media that the decision to leave the 
Quad was due to a desire to appease China (Buchan & Rimland, 2020; Tow, 2019). 
The idea that Australia’s departure from the Quad was the result of pressure from China 
can be found repeatedly across a variety of sources inside and outside the government 
sphere. Although the Prime Minister of Australia refuted this belief: “a number of right-
wing Quad zealots […] insisted that the reason the Quad didn't proceed was […] allegedly 
because I was […] keen to appease Beijing”, (Rudd, 2019). (Doogue, 2008); “The 2007 
dialogue died a premature death when Kevin Rudd-led Australia buckled under Chinese 
pressure” (Talukdar, 2017). Other sources offer additional speculative answers to the 
question of the ending of the Quad, however, no official statements were given as to the 
reason.  
This idea that the end of the Quad was specifically due to a desire to appease China is 
significant, as the year 2008 presented unprecedented domestic conditions [see condition 
of the domestic economy – 2008; and perception of electoral concerns – 2008] that lends 
credibility to the idea that Rudd, too, would have also positioned Australia to leave the 
Quad due to his own reticence to alienate China. This, Australia’s decision to withdraw 
from the Quad, contradicts the result one could expect on the basis of a continued 
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high level of perceived threat in 2008. This discrepancy between system-level pressure (the 
perception of threat) and Australia’s alignment decisions suggests that additional factors 
play a role. The following two sections provide insights into the domestic-level conditions 
thought to have disrupted or “intervened” a balancing reaction in spite of this perception of 
threat.  
Condition of Australia’s domestic economy – 2008 
 
In order to explain the observed discrepancy between system-level pressure (the level of 
perceived threat) and Australia’s alignment decisions (Australia’s withdrawal from the 
Quad) this section explores the condition of Australia’s domestic economy at the time 
period of 2008 and the impact that could have had on Australia’s alignment decisions. The 
economic condition of Australia in 2008 was drastically different from the previous year, 
given that the condition of the domestic economy was positive and growing in 2007, while 
2008 saw the start of the global financial crisis, an uncertain economic future, and a 
negative economic condition. For alignment, the negative perception of the economic 
condition would have imposed more severe constraints on alignment decisions, given a 
lessened ability to commit Australia’s resources to participate in an alignment, and greater 
sensitivity to consequences that may have arisen from alienating China as an economic 
resource.  
Statements regarding the economic condition in 2008 were plentiful and direct. The 
Governor of the Reserve Bank of Australia noted the downturn facing Australia and the rest 
of the world: “The Australian economy has seen a significant change in circumstances over 
the past six months […] Our households, like those elsewhere, have observed financial 
turmoil and a decline in share prices and have become more cautious.” (Stevens, 2008). 
This observation was also expressed by the Prime Minister, whom touched on the negative 
(i.e. recession, economic downturn) condition of the Australian economy. In a 2008 
Address to the Nation the Prime Minister directly states: “the truth is that we are going 
through the worst financial crisis in our lifetime. I’ve described it as the economic 
equivalent of a national security crisis […] those tough times have now arrived” (Rudd, 
61 
 
2008b); as did the Treasurer of Australia: “We're in the middle of the worst financial crisis 
ever to confront the modern market economy” (Staff Reporters, 2008). Documents by the 
Australian Minister of Trade also provide evidence of this negative economic condition. In 
a speech entitled “Meeting the Challenges”, the Trade Minister notes that Australian 
exports are already underperforming in early 2008, and that “[t]he [Australian] Government 
is acting quickly to put in place the policies, programs and infrastructure necessary to 
address these and other challenges facing Australia.” (Crean, 2008). Which evidences that 
the Australian government was experiencing the recession in the early months of the year, 
and was already acting to counter it. This reflects the notion that shifts in the ‘institutional 
power’ of the state itself can impact systems-level pressures to align through the allocation 
of resources as well as which the particular ideas (or issues) that are most pressing to a 
populace and government (Kitchen, 2009). 
In addition, a timeline of Australia’s domestic economic condition in the context of the 
global financial crisis can be observed in the texts and documents of a variety of actors. Mr. 
Rudd outlines in 2009 that: “[i]n the space of just 18 months, this crisis has become one of 
the greatest assaults on global economic stability to have occurred in three-quarters of a 
century” (Rudd, 2009). As did the Secretary to the Australian Treasury, whom outlined the 
timing of the global financial crisis (GFC) in a more exact manner: “However, even in early 
2008, the global financial crisis was already on the scene, with possible serious flow-on 
implications for global growth” (Kennedy, 2009). While the Trade Minister also noted that 
Australia had already seen the effects of the GFC in the January to March 2008 period: 
“Our exports have underperformed […] The economic policy directions taken in the next 
12 months will be critical.” (Crean, 2008) This data provides evidence that the perception 
of condition of the domestic economic was negative or “bad”. Thus, the economic 
constraints would have made external alignment against China more costly, and could have 
had an impact on Australia’s alignment decisions in the context of the Quad, even in early 
2008. 
The timing of the global financial crisis and of Australia’s decision to cease participation in 
the Quad is significant given China is seen as an especially important trading partner in 
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2008, especially given the negative condition of Australia’s domestic economy. This can be 
seen in the texts of a variety of political levels and sectors. Including the Governor of the 
Reserve Bank of Australia: “the fortunes of the Chinese economy are increasingly 
important, particularly for Australia and other countries in our time zone.” (Stevens, 2008). 
As well as the Prime Minister of Australia:   
the important thing is, to take our current relationship with China to a new level. I 
believe that the economic opportunities between us are significant […] China which 
has got great economic opportunities […] for us […] huge opportunity for 
Australian business. (Rudd, 2008) 
The Prime Minister also highlights the damage that could still be done to the world 
economy if China was to stop their beneficial spending and notes rather tellingly that “this 
looms as a challenge for statecraft; we cannot simply hope that individual market 
participants somehow magically do the right thing” (Rudd, 2009). While another opinion 
piece written by Mr. Rudd after Australia left the Quad, reiterates the importance that China 
had as a source of positive economic growth for Australia and the rest of the world during 
the GFC (Rudd, 2019). 
The importance of the overlap of the timing the global financial crisis, and Australia’s 
decision to formally distance itself from the Quad cannot be dismissed. In 2008, facing the 
contraction of the economy, and with alignment against China becoming increasingly 
costly due to China’s increasing economic importance for Australia, the perception of the 
negative condition of the domestic economy in 2008 contributed to a high-level of 
domestic-level costs; which would have disincentivized Australia from external alignment 
despite a perception of threat. Thus, in other words, the domestic economic condition could 
have provided enough impetus for Australia to “ignore” its overall threat perception from 
China, to that of the more immediate and present “domestic threat” of the economic crisis. 
Having now examined the Australian economic condition in 2008, this thesis now turns to 
the perception of the electoral concerns for the same year.       
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Perception of electoral concerns – 2008 
 
In addition to the contribution of economic aspect in Australia’s decision to align, the 
political dimensions of domestic-level costs can also work for or against alignment, in 
constraining (or freeing) the choices political leaders are able to make. Thus, this section 
turns to the next aspect of domestic-level factors to explore how perceived threat to 
Australia’s (governmental and) domestic stability impacted Australia’s alignment 
decisions. 
As previously mentioned, the end of 2007 saw the loss of one longstanding Prime Minister, 
John Howard, to make way for a new one, Kevin Rudd. Looking to the early days of Prime 
Minister Kevin Rudd’s office, the data shows alignment with the notion that political 
leaders enjoy more freedom of decisions within the early days of a term in office. The first 
mention of the decision to leave was within 80 days of his election (from 25 November 
2007 to the first week of February 2008 [Smith]). While Rudd himself noted that the 
official departure occurred: “in March 2008 […] we had made clear that we would not be 
continuing Australian participation with the Quad” (Rudd, 2019), which also falls within 
the first 100 days of his term in office. This timing is also reflected in a number of other 
policy changes Rudd highlights and carries out early in his days in office, (Rudd, 2008c; 
“Combat troops to come home from Iraq”, 2007). These changes provide support to the 
notion that the agency held by political figures (a domestic-level factor47) are important in 
alignment decisions (system-level), and that a new government has more freedom of 
decision. The departure from the Quad can also be seen as an effort by the Rudd 
government to differentiate itself from the Howard government, and reflective of changing 
priorities in the governments (Parliament of Australia, 2008b) as with a number of the other 
early changes the government made, and with the changing importance of the issues facing 
the population of Australia, as mentioned in the previous section (i.e. the downturn in the 
domestic economy). 
 
47 Or even individual level. 
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Documents also support that notion that the perception of electoral concerns, and thereby 
the political environment of 2008, led to Australia’s decision not to continue with the 
alignment. In a retrospective, former Prime Minister Rudd noted that Australia’s continued 
participation in the Quad would have brought forth a “not insignificant question of 
Australian national interests” in 2008 the context of Australia’s own “bilateral relationship 
with China” (Rudd, 2019). This sentiment, and Rudd’s opinion that participation in the 
Quad would be “embroiling” Australia in an “emerging military alliance with Japan against 
China” (Rudd, 2019) suggests that participation in the Quad was concerning for Rudd in 
the context of his own continued political career. This is further supported by Rudd’s 
description that “any talk of the Quad was political anathema” (Rudd, 2019) – essentially a 
subject that was capable of contributing damage to a political career. 
Documents from 2008 support this retrospective in a number of ways. The Australian 
Minister for Trade noted in mid-2008 that a commitment to the Quad would restrict the 
government’s ability to freely navigate a bilateral relationship with China (Smith, 2008c). 
While Rudd also states in 2008 that “I believe that the economic opportunities between us 
[Australian and China] are significant […] we need to have a strategic discussion about 
that, long term - China's interest, our national interests.” (Rudd, 2008) In addition, Rudd 
alludes in 2008 to the fact that his perception of the Quad is that of a defence grouping, 
framing the Quad as Howards attempt to “quadrilateralize” (Rudd, 2008) Howards security 
agreement with Japan. Further stating:  
I don’t think that’s an appropriate direction for us to go at this stage […] how do 
you unfold a future relationship with China which has got great economic 
opportunities […] But is that enhanced or helped in any way but some sort of 
quadrilateral relationship with New Delhi? I don't think so. (Rudd, 2008) 
In addition to showcasing evidence that the Quad was still being debated as the GFC 
developed, this belays the political and economic cost of alignment decisions that the Prime 
Minister alluded to in his retrospective. Meaning that by not committing itself to the Quad, 
Australia’s government would have more freedom, whereas there would be a political (and 
economic) cost in alienating China by electing to commit to the Quad.  
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Thus, the data from 2008 shows that perception of electoral concerns would have 
contributed to a high level of domestic costs. While at first glance the data appears to 
suggest that Mr. Rudd enjoyed a low-level of political costs associated with his decision to 
leave the Quad, the impact of the GFC and the increased importance of the Australia-China 
relationship from an economic and political standpoint evident that the alignment decision 
to depart the Quad was a matter of electoral concern. Thus, Australia’s decision to depart 
the Quad can be seen as the Prime Minister avoiding a high-level political (and economic) 
cost. In other words, continuing with the Quad could have led to a scenario where China 
would be less likely to trade favorably with Australia, seeing the Quad as an antagonistic 
grouping, which would have also led to political implications for those in power.  
 
Summary – 2008 
Looking to the events of 2008, there is clear evidence of Australia’s decision to cease its 
alignment as a member of the Quad, as well as high domestic-level costs, and a high 
perception of threat regarding China. The domestic-level costs are reflected in the 
indicators of a perception of a ‘bad’ or negative domestic economic condition, and electoral 
concerns that suggest that alignment was seen as having political and economic 
consequences regardless of the presence of threat. This supports the hypothesis that high 
domestic-level costs can circumvent balancing expectations.  
4.4 The reformation of the Quad - 2017 
 
Australia’s perception of threat – 2017 
 
Whereas the previous sections have focused on Australia’s decision to participate in the 
Quad (2007) and the reversal of this decision (2008), the following sections turn to 
Australia’s renewed decision to align with the Quad and the revival of the format. 
Australia’s perception of threat, in the context of China, is even more apparent in 2017, 
than previously seen in 2007 and 2008. It is such that the documents and texts examined 
bring evidence of a perception of China’s threat directly to the forefront. Such as in a rather 
ominous keynote speech for a regional security summit, wherein the Prime Minister of 
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Australia noted the current “Manichaean”48 (Turnbull, 2017a) choice facing the world 
today. Australia’s Prime Minister borrows a Chinese proverb: “Big fish eat small fish and 
small fish eat shrimps” (Turnbull, 2017a) that is in close alignment with a later assessment 
in his speech about how the world, including Australia, perceives China in one of the most 
direct vocalisations of the threat China poses. In the same speech, the Australian Prime 
Minister pointedly states: “[s]ome fear that China will seek to impose a latter-day Monroe 
Doctrine on this hemisphere in order to dominate the region, marginalising the role and 
contribution of other nations, in particular the United States.” (Turnbull, 2017a)). This 
perception of threat can be seen expressed by a variety of actors and in a number of 
documents; “latent security tensions that are now palpable on the Koran peninsula, in the 
East and South China seas and further afield” (Turnbull, 2017a); “change, unprecedented in 
its scale and pace, is the tenor of our times. These are […] also times of uncertainty, of risk, 
indeed of danger.” (Australian Government49, 2017); and “The South China Sea is a major 
fault line in the regional order.” (Australian Government, 2017, p. 46). These tensions all 
have an additional military dimension, wherein China is implied by the Australian Defence 
Minister to be contributing to the military might of other antagonistic countries in the 
context of nuclear and weapons capabilities, “China is the source of the majority, 95 
percent, of direct investment into North Korea.” (Bishop, 2017). As it is also perceived by 
policy analysts: “China’s militarisation of the South China Sea […] has brought its power-
projection capabilities 1200km closer to Australia’s northern approaches.” (Nicholson, 
2017b). Again echoing a concern with proximal factors. 
In addition, the documents and texts examined show Australia’s preoccupation with  
Chinese threat in the context of a number of issues relating to a sense of China 
overreaching its influence and dominance in Australia. These include a fear that there is 
“growing leverage over academia” by China (Cave & Williams, 2017), whereby Australian 
Universities in 2017 were becoming increasingly dependent on the tuition paid by Chinese 
students, and “that Beijing is using this leverage to stifle critical views” (Cave & Williams, 
48  Manichaean: A term that represents the face-off or struggle between a good, spiritual world of light, and 
the evil of a material world of darkness.  
49 The Prime Minister’s introduction, no page number. 
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2017). This again implies a preoccupation with dominance and sovereignty concerns, i.e. 
China infringing on freedom of expression by overreaching into Australia. Another instance 
of which includes a 2017 political scandal wherein monetary contributions were made to 
Australian political figures from a variety of actors in and associated with China: 
“Australia’s intelligence chief had identified two prominent businessmen of Chinese 
descent, who have donated millions across the political spectrum in recent years, as 
possible agents for the Chinese government” (Cave & Williams, 2017). In response, the 
Australian Government put legislation in place to discourage and fight “growing attempts 
by foreign governments or their proxies to exert inappropriate influence on and to 
undermine Australia’s sovereign institutions and decision making.” (Australian 
Government, 2017, p. 75) More specifically: “the laws would criminalise acts such as 
opposition senator Sam Dastyari's alleged soliciting of a donation from a Chinese 
businessman, Huang Xiangmo, to cover personal expenses.” (Birtles, 2017). These actions 
were perceived by figures in China to have been focused against them, although at the time 
they were put in place, Australia claimed this was not the case. (Greene, 2017) 
Indeed, the words of the Australian Prime Minister come across as being against China, or 
specifically perceiving China as a threat towards Australia, Australian sovereignty, and 
Australian domestic concerns: “just as modern China was based on an assertion of national 
sovereignty, so China should always respect the sovereignty of other nations including, of 
course, our own.” (Turnbull, 2017b); “Modern China was founded in 1949 with these 
words, The Chinese people have stood up' […] ‘and we stand up and so we say, the 
Australian people stand up.’” (Turnbull, 2017c). This blatant perception of threat can be 
seen as offering evidence of the sentiment that “China’s growing influence on the regional 
and global issues of greatest consequence to our security and prosperity” (Australian 
Government , 2017, p. 37).  
This is further confirmed with additional evidence of concern with the potential for 
misunderstandings and the threat that provides the region surrounding Australia and its 
allies: “an era of shifting power balances and greater rivalry […] as China’s power grows, 
tensions could also flare between them [China and the United States]” (Australian 
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Government, 2017, p. 38-39). This highlights that there is a very present perception of the 
threat China poses to Australia currently as well as possibly in the future with the gravity of 
the impact of China’s actions. 
Additionally, there is an economic dynamic to threat present in 2017: “economic and 
security interests are converging […] Australia must be sovereign, not reliant” (Australian 
Government50, 2017); “tensions could also flare between them over trade and other 
economic issues. Australia will [work to] ensure economic tension between [China and the 
United States] does not fuel strategic rivalry or damage the multilateral trading system.” 
(Australian Government, 2017, p. 38-39) This provides significant evidence of the 
intersection of economic concerns and threat in the context of China. There are also 
recurring implicit references that highlight this preoccupation on the danger of “reliance”51, 
as well as statements about being in a period of flux, or change, and an awareness of the 
danger this holds for the economy: “it remains possible that escalating geopolitical tensions 
and increased global trade protectionism could derail the current economic expansion” (The 
Reserve Bank of Australia, 2017); “The uncertainty surrounding China's growth outlook 
has implications for Australian resource exports, commodity prices and the terms of trade.” 
(The Reserve Bank of Australia, 2017).  
Thus, the data from 2017 supports the argument that Australia had a high-level of 
perception of threat of China given the diverse and continued ways in which China is 
shown to present a threat to Australia. Having now explored Australia’s threat perception in 
2017, the next section turns to Australia’s alignment decisions in the same period to explore 
how perception of threat affected Australia’s decision to re-align with the Quad. 
Australia’s alignment decisions – 2017 
 
This section explores Australia’s alignment with the Quad in 2017. It is quite apparent, in 
looking to political and media sources in 2017, that there is a consensus that Australia made 
 
50 The Prime Minister’s introduction, no page number. 
51 This can be seen in the fear that Australian Universities were “dependent on the tuition paid by Chinese 
students”( Cave and Williams) (see Perception of Threat – 2017), 
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the decision to participate in the reformation of the Quad in 2017 (as well as in following 
years). This is evident in the documents from a variety of political levels in Australia, such 
as in the Prime Minister’s contribution to the issue of joint statements on the revival and 
continuation of the Quads. All four members released statements about the continuation, 
the content of the statement was largely the same, with an Australia media release noting 
that: “[t]he participants committed to continuing quadrilateral discussions and deepening 
cooperation on the basis of shared values and principles.” (Australian Government, 2017b. 
As well Prime Minister Turnbull in stated that he: “look[ed] forward to those discussions 
and that engagement progressing” (Turnbull, 2017e), when asked whether the Quad would 
“be rebooted” during a doorstep for the 2017 East Asia Summit (Turnbull, 2017e). Another 
meeting between Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull and Japanese Prime Minister Abe in 
2017 also highlighted the cooperation and the desired outcomes of the Quad: “Japan and 
Australia will continue to work proactively, alongside the US and other like-minded 
countries, including India, to maintain the rules-based international order and support a 
peaceful and stable Indo-Pacific region.” (Turnbull, 2017g) While the Defence Minister 
expressed that: “Australia is very interested in a quadrilateral engagement with India, Japan 
and the United States” (Bishop, 2017). 
A wide range of media sources provide extra insight into the Quad and Australia’s 
participation in 2017. Meetings between members received significant media attention – 
“India, Japan, Australia and the US met on the sidelines of the East Asia Summit in Manila 
on Sunday as the quadrilateral security dialogue took shape” (Talukdar, 2017); and “Senior 
officials from the United States, Japan, India, and Australia met in Manila on Saturday […] 
to discuss regional and global cooperation.” (Panda, 2017), during the 2017 East Asia 
Summit, wherein each country released a statement, which they expressed their “committed 
to continuing quadrilateral discussions” (Panda, 2017). As well as being noted in a 
retrospective by the Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade of Australia, 
with the statement that “the Quad has had two meetings since it was reconstituted last year, 
and I am confident that it will become an important part of our regional diplomacy.” 
(Australian Government, 2018) Thus, it is reasonable to say, looking back to the events of 
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2017 and those following, that Australia’s alignment decisions in 2017 illustrate both the 
general reformation of the Quad, as well as Australia’s recommitment to the formation. 
Having now looked to Australia’s decision to participate in the renewal of the Quad and the 
revival of the format in 2017 as well as the system-level factor of threat related to this 
decision, the next sections explore the domestic-level factors coinciding with this decision.  
Condition of Australia’s domestic economy – 2017 
 
Having explored system-level pressures in the perception of threat and Australia’s 
alignment decisions within the 2017 period, the following sections turns to the domestic-
level costs present in 2017. This section turns first to the condition of Australia’s domestic 
economy and its potential impact on Australia’s alignment decisions. The condition of the 
Australian economy in 2017 can be seen as positive (i.e. growing, not stagnating or in a 
recession).  
Positive assessments of the Australian economic condition are direct and plentiful across 
the documents examined, with multiple actors and sectors referring to a positive (i.e. good) 
economic condition. Including the Australian Prime Minister: “So as we face the future, we 
have very good reason to be optimistic. Our economy is growing.” (Turnbull, 2017f). As 
well as documents from the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade: “our 
[Australia’s] strong economy”, (Australian Government, 2017); and the Minister for Trade 
Tourism and Investment: “Australia’s economy is now growing at a faster rate than all 
other major developed economies.” (Ciobo, 2017). The Governor of the Reserve Bank of 
Australia also notes that: “Financial conditions remain favourable” (Lowe, 2017). The 
common thread across all of the documents and texts examined regarding 2017 is of a 
positive economic condition within Australia. 
Yet, there is a slight underlying sense of caution in 2017, which can largely be seen as a 
response of the events of the global financial crisis of 2008. Nearly ten years after the GFC, 
Reserve Bank of Australia noted that: “[h]ousehold consumption growth is forecast to pick 
up a little, but to a rate that is lower than the average seen prior to the financial crisis” (The 
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Reserve Bank of Australia, 2017). While the Assistant Governor of the body that issued the 
report remarked that: 
The Bank's work on financial stability has evolved over the past 20 years and 
particularly since the financial crisis. At the big picture level, the way we look at it 
hasn't changed that much […] But we are even more attuned to the tail risks than we 
were and more attuned to the need to take action if we sense that the risks are 
building. We are, as are policymakers globally, more sensitive to risk. (Bullock. 
2017).  
This can also be seen in documents from the Australian treasury in 2017, such as a mid-
year speech that highlights “slower productivity growth” yet emphasizes that “[a]s we are 
currently emerging from the tail end of that major cyclical event there is some cause for 
optimism.” (Australian Government The Treasury, 2017) Thereby, it can be said that these 
cautionary words are that simply that – cautionary, not a sign of a negative economic 
condition. Meaning that although Australia is – in the words of its own government – 
“more sensitive to risk” (Bullock, 2017) the condition of the Australian economy is not 
such that it would have disincentivised Australia from external alignment.   
Thus, the data from 2017 shows that the condition of the domestic economy in Australia is 
“positive” – it is growing, gaining strength and seen as being ‘good’ and strong. While 
Australia is more subdued in its reporting of such, this evidences heightened risk sensitivity 
rather than a negative condition. As such the contribution of this factor to domestic-level 
costs can be said to be low because, regardless of a sense of caution, the condition of the 
domestic economy is positive overall. This positive condition of the domestic economy 
would, therefore, not have contributed to increased domestic-level costs. Now having 
examined the domestic economy in 2017, the next section looks to the perceived threat to 
Australia’s (governmental and) domestic stability in the same time period, to analyse the 




Perception of electoral concerns – 2017 
 
Document from the year 2017 provide plentiful evidence of a clear sentiment of present and 
growing concern regarding global and regional instability during the period, however there 
is little evidence of electoral concerns. The year 2017 was not an election year for 
Australia, with the closest election at the Prime Minister level being held just a few months 
prior, on July 2nd 2016. As previously noted in ‘perception of electoral concerns – 2008’ it 
is not unheard of for Australia to see the ousting of a sitting Prime Minister and new 
elections within even this short of a time period (Miletic, 2015). Regardless, however, there 
is limited evidence that such electoral concerns were felt by the new Prime Minister during 
this period. Opinion polls from the year show that while Mr. Turnbull suffered some 
unpopularity, it was not to a degree that would call into question his standing as Prime 
Minister: “Labor retains thumping 54% to 46% lead over Coalition in the latest survey even 
as 40% of voters prefer Turnbull as prime minister compared with Shorten’s 28%” 
(Murphy, 2017); “An analysis of 6943 voters in Newspoll surveys taken between February 
and April reveals a deepening frustration with both major party leaders, with Mr Turnbull’s 
net satisfaction rating declining by five percentage points since August while the 
Opposition Leader’s fell by nine” (Crowe, 2017), findings that were also echoed by 
international media sources, which noted the Prime Minister was losing ground to “Trump-
style Australian Populists” (Heath, 2017). 
It is also clear, looking to the timing of Australia’s return to the Quad, that the decision was 
not made within the first 100 days of the Prime Minister’s term. The first mention of a 
return to the Quad was on April 20th 2017: “Australia is very interested in a quadrilateral 
engagement with India, Japan and the United States” (Bishop, 2017) – 292 days after the 
Prime Minister’s entry into office. Turning to other events of 2017, it is clear that while 
there is evidence of destabilizing events to some in power (i.e. electoral concerns), they do 
neither impact the leadership positions (i.e. the Prime Minister) nor suggest economic 
ramifications in the sense of alienating China to the degree that trade relationships are 
called into question. As can be seen with Australia’s experience with the political 
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interference from China in 2017, which resulted in a legislative overhaul of espionage 
initiatives (Belot, 2017) (see Perception of threat – 2017). Thus, it can be said that the year 
2017 was a period of a low electoral concerns, and the documents and sources from the 
time indicate that the domestic-level costs resulting from both the condition of the domestic 
economy and electoral concern indicators from 2017 were ‘low’.  
Summary – 2017 
Looking to the events of 2017, there is clear evidence of Australia’s decision to align again 
as a member of the Quad, as well as a low domestic-level costs, and a high perception of 
threat regarding China. The low domestic-level costs are reflected in the indicators of a 
perception of a positive domestic economic condition, and little evidence of electoral 
concerns during the time period.  
5. Conclusion
The aim of the study was to explain the variation in Australia’s alignment decisions 
through an examination of the impact of domestic-level factors against system-level 
pressures to balance. For this purpose, the study examined Australia’s alignment decisions 
in the context of its participation in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue at three points in 
time. Seeking to answer the question of: what explains Australia’s alignment decisions vis-
à-vis the first formation, cessation and reformation of the Quad over a short period of time, 
despite the fact that China’s threat trajectory has been continuously on the rise? The 
theoretical framework used to find the answer to this question was the result of utilizing 
multiple lenses of analysis. The empirical analysis of this thesis demonstrates that a 
perception of threat alone does not explain Australia’s alignment decisions across the time 
period in observation. Only once the perception of threat is examined in combination with 
domestic factors (i.e. perception of economic condition and electoral concerns) is the 
observed balancing behaviour of Australia explained. 
In order to reach these findings, alignments and alliances were first conceptualized in order 
to capture the nature of the Quad, which, unlike a traditional alliance, is a much more 
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flexible and informal formation. Secondly, this was followed by an introduction to theories 
of alignment formation, with a specific emphasis on balance of threat. Which postulates 
that threat is the most fundamental cause of alignment formation; and that states ally with 
or against the most threatening power (Hume, 1994; Walt, 1985). Yet, balance of threat 
only takes system-level pressures (i.e. threat) into consideration, thus an explanation of the 
importance of domestic-level factors followed through an examination of neoclassical 
realism and other approaches. These brought the importance of the influence of domestic-
level actors and events to the forefront, and postulated that the system-level pressures of 
(for example) balance of threat, must be translated through intervening domestic-level 
variables (Rosecrance, et. al, 1993; Kitchen, 2010) in order to gain a greater understanding 
of alignment formation. Drawing on a study by Barnett and Levy (1991), two primary 
domestic-level factors – together, domestic-level costs – were singled out as being of 
particular importance, and were adjusted to be reflective of an advanced democratic state; 
the condition of the domestic economy, and electoral concerns.  
As such, this thesis looked to data from 2007 to present, with a particular focus on 2007, 
2008, and 2017, to observe any connections between domestic-level factors and system-
level pressures to balance. The findings from 2007 were of a high perception of threat and 
low domestic-level costs, as well as a positive alignment decision; while the findings from 
2008, were of a high perception of threat, high domestic-level costs, and a negative 
alignment decision. Finally, the findings from 2017 were of a continued high perception of 
threat, as well as low domestic-level costs and a return to a positive alignment decision. 
The data thereby demonstrates that a perception of threat alone does not explain Australia’s 
alignment decisions across the time period in observation. Only once the perception of 
threat is examined in combination with domestic factors (i.e. perception of economic 
condition and electoral concerns) is the observed balancing behaviour of Australia 
explained. Thus, the theoretical expectations that high domestic-level costs act as an 
intervening variable in the face of system-level pressures to align are confirmed. With this, 
the thesis has achieved its aim and provided insights into how domestic-level factors shape 
alignment decisions against system-level pressures to align. Highlighting the importance of 
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taking domestic-level factors into consideration when examining alignment decisions 
against system-level pressures such as threat. 
The findings, however, must be prefaced with the limitations of this study. First, this study 
was limited to a single-case analysis and a sole perspective, yet the Quad was a grouping of 
four states, and a cross-case analysis would have been beneficial to explore whether 
domestic-level conditions also mediated the alignment decisions of the other members, 
although they showed less behavioural variation. As the limitations and constraints of a 
master’s thesis would not have made such a study possible, this approach and these 
findings could provide the starting point for a further study of the Quad, or other 
alignments occurring within similar contexts. Second, and relating to the beneficial nature 
of a cross-case analysis, the scope of this thesis meant that a more thorough understanding 
of the Prime Ministers’ decisions, moving beyond domestic level constrains to the 
individual level, were not possible. The neoclassical realist literature examined during this 
course of this thesis has posited that the agency of a political leader is shaped by the values 
of a state. This opens up a variety of potential questions (i.e. does Australian culture and 
thereby Australian political leaders value alignment? Does one political leader value 
American values and thereby alignment with Americans more than another?) that were not 
possible to answer within the constraints of this thesis, but would provide greater insight 
into domestic-level influences in alignment decisions. Finally, as with all studies of this 
nature, the interpretation of the presence and meaning of perception, and the scope of 
‘threat’ itself, is dependent to an extent upon an author’s subjective interpretation. While a 
strategy of mitigation was put in place by focusing on documents and sources that provided 
consistency and were representative of a variety of levels of government, policy makers and 
the public, the concept of ‘threat’ itself becomes more elusive when subject to diplomatic 
signaling, such as labeling states or their respective actions ‘risks’ or ‘challenges’ rather 
than using the word ‘threat’ outright.  
Regardless, the findings of this paper connect to the existing literature on the Quad, and 
provide an examination of Australia’s alignment decisions that benefits from both a wider 
scope and more in-depth exploration than previous studies. First, the finding shows that 
76 
 
domestic-level factors do have an impact on alignment decisions, even in the presence of 
threat, which demonstrates the value in exploring their impact on the Quad (and other 
alignments) to continue understanding which domestic-level variables can be thought to be 
the most influential and impactful. Second, these findings and the topic are timely, given 
the resurgence in studies on the Quad and China, as well as the current pandemic crisis, 
which has brought on new threats, economic challenges, and electoral concerns. However, 
as the events of the pandemic are still on-going, it is not possible to compare the events of 
2008 and 2020 in a conclusive way. Comparisons may, however, be possible in the future, 
allowing for a more nuanced understanding of the interaction of domestic-level factors and 
system-level pressures in alignment decisions. Therefore, it can be said that the findings of 
this study contribute both to the understanding of the Quad; as well as state alignment 
decisions in the context of the interaction of domestic-level factors and system-level 
pressures more generally.        
In conclusion, this thesis presented a theoretical framework with which to explore state 
alignment decisions, and utilized this in an analysis of Australia’s alignment decisions 
within the context of the Quad. By highlighting the importance of domestic-level variables 
against realist explanations of alignment formation (i.e. balance of threat) this study was 
able to provide an account of Australia’s decisions over a set time period to explain the 
deviation in Australia’s alignment decisions in the Quad (i.e. from alignment (2007), to 
withdrawal (2008), and again to alignment (2017)) in the face of a perception of a high-
level of threat in the context of China. It was observed that Australia did perceive a high-
level of threat from China across the time period, but elected to withdraw from the Quad 
due to the influence of domestic-level factors; the first being the agency of the Australian 
Prime Minister, and the second being the impact of the economic crisis and Australia’s 
need to engage with China as a trading partner, rather than antagonise the relationship due 
to the Quad. The findings that resulted from this analysis can therefore be said to contribute 
to the existing literature on the Quad, and state alignment decisions; and as such, this study 
have provided an answer to the research question regarding the Australia’s deviation of 
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